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In this thesis, I will argue that a challenge to the combatting of sexual prejudice (more commonly 
known as homophobia) through argument and evidence is that those on both sides of the issue are 
prone to a phenomenon known in psychology as confirmation bias. While the motivating concern of 
the thesis is sexual prejudice, and while I do discuss sexual prejudice throughout the thesis, I will focus 
mostly on confirmation bias, with the understanding that the picture I set out will have implications 
for combatting sexual prejudice at a later stage. The term confirmation bias refers either to the 
tendency to look for evidence which confirms one's already-held beliefs, or to engage differently with 
evidence based on whether or not you agree with its conclusion. After dissecting two paradigmatic 
experiments which explore these two kinds of confirmation bias, and arguing that they can be further 
broken down into sub-phenomena, I will focus on the latter kind, as I think it is the more relevant to 
sexual prejudice. Its essential effect on beliefs is to hold them steady in the face of evidence. In an 
attempt to explore the motivations we might have for engaging in this form of confirmation bias, I will 
argue that we can understand the tendency through a combination of a picture of beliefs as forming 
an interconnected web, and an understanding of the effect of affective elements on belief. 
Furthermore, given this motivational story, it is sometimes reasonable to hold beliefs steady. I will 
argue that finding the balance between giving up beliefs too easily in the face of contrary evidence, 
and holding onto them too rigidly, is an epistemic virtue. Finally, defending my picture from the 
objection that the mental states I discuss do not count as beliefs, I will argue that confirmation bias is 
a way of maintaining fixed beliefs.
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Introduction.
In this thesis, I will argue that part of the problem with combatting sexual prejudice (more commonly 
known as homophobia) through argument and evidence is that those engaging in the debate are 
prone to confirmation bias. To phrase this in more commonly epistemic terms, people engaging in the 
debate are prone to having fixed beliefs. While the motivating concern behind this thesis is sexual 
prejudice, and while I will be touching on sexual prejudice in my thesis, I will not be focusing on it in 
any great detail. Rather, I will be looking at the kind of epistemic and psychological factors that affect 
debates, with the view that the work I do here will have implications for how we approach 
disagreement and debate in the realm of sexual prejudice. I think that what I say here will have 
implications for debate that extend to topics beyond sexual prejudice. I will not, however, be arguing 
that this is the only thing that affects these kinds of debates -  in fact, I think it is one, very specific, 
though important, factor to consider when one is thinking about engagement in areas such as sexual 
prejudice. This way of engaging with evidence is, I will argue, partly a result of the way our belief- 
systems function as a whole, and partly a result of the importance beliefs of this kind often have to 
us.
In Chapter 1, I will argue that the term confirmation bias actually refers to a grouping of 
phenomena, only some of which are relevant to sexual prejudice in the way I am interested in. There 
are three in particular that I isolate -  idee fixe, hyper criticality, and polarization. Idee fixe is the central 
phenomenon here. It is essentially the tendency to keep a belief or beliefs steady in the face of 
contradictory evidence. Hyper-criticality -  the tendency to evaluate disconfirming evidence more 
harshly than it deserves, and to treat confirming evidence as being better than it deserves, is a way of 
maintaining a belief in the face of contradictory evidence, and thus a way of engaging in idee fixe. 
Polarization can be a result of the desire to hold beliefs steady, but is a less understandable 
phenomenon than either idee fixe or hyper-criticality. In Chapter 2, after briefly going into more detail 
on what I think sexual prejudice is, I will try to explain how the phenomena might come to characterise 
the way some of our beliefs work, arguing that if we see beliefs as forming a web, we can gain some 
understanding of the way in which our doxastic systems might lead us to hold some beliefs steady. 
Using Quine, I will try to explain the phenomena by appealing to a web picture of belief. While this 
gives us some answers, I argue that it only partly captures what is going on in many cases where beliefs 
are prone to the phenomena. I argue that the emotional, attitudinal and value-laden aspects of some 
beliefs play a vital role in explaining why we hold them fixed. I will not be trying to give a full, 
comprehensive account of all the possible motivations for confirmation bias. I rather want to attempt 
the beginning of an explanation -  one I think is plausible, but is unlikely to capture everything that
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could be motivating it. Having thus set out the picture of what I think is happening when we hold 
beliefs steady, in Chapter 3 I will look at the tendency towards the phenomena in the light of 
intellectual virtues and vices, arguing that the tendency towards idee fixe can be seen as a tendency 
towards the epistemic vice of rigidity. Finally, in Chapter 4, I will defend this picture from the view that 
the mental states I have been discussing do not count as beliefs, arguing that they are in fact a kind of 
fixed belief.
While there has been work done on confirmation bias, the majority of it has been done in 
Psychology. There have been a fair number of experiments detailing it. There has also been some work 
done on it on philosophy, but it is fairly neglected territory here. As far as I know, though, my particular 
focus on sexual prejudice is new. I also think that the way I try and break down confirmation bias into 
its components, and the particular motivational account of it that I give, have not been explored 
before. I am trying to sketch out a plausible account of how these phenomena might work. Much of 
what I say touches on empirical questions, however, and may need to be tested at a future date.
This project is, I think, important as a starting point to thinking about the kinds of fixed beliefs 
we encounter in argument generally. More specifically, I think it is important because of its possible 
applications in the realm of prejudice. There has been recent progress in the area of prejudice -  the 
increased number of countries (most recently the United States of America) who have legalised 
marriage between same-sex couples. Despite this, racist, sexist, homophobic, and other prejudicial 
beliefs are still very much in effect. From groups who are explicitly anti-homosexuality, such as the 
Westboro Baptist Church, to anti-Islamic beliefs in Western countries to xenophobia in South Africa, 
prejudice is very much present in the lives of people today. In this thesis, I am going to be focusing on 
what is commonly referred to as homophobia in particular. Though there has recently been progress 
in this area, it is still fairly widespread, as is shown by the recent resistance to the legalisation of gay 
marriage (support for the legalisation of same-sex marriage in the U.S.A recently was between 57% 
and 60%,1 depending on where you look. This is good, but not yet enough, particularly when 
contrasted with the challenges LGBTIAQ people tend to face, and the levels of bullying gay teenagers 
experience. According to the Human Rights Campaign website, 4 in 10 LGBTIAQ youth live in 
communities they perceive as being unaccepting of LGBTIAQ people. LGBTIAQ youth are twice as likely 
to have been physically assaulted, kicked or pushed at school as straight youth. LGBTIAQ youth are 1
1 New, 'In the Wake of Obergefell, Three New Polls Show Reduced Support for Same-sex Marriage', Accessed 
10 November 2016 from http://www.nationalreview.com/comer/421443/obergefell-same-sex-marriage-poll- 
reduced-support ; Dutton, De Pinto, Salvanto, and Backus, 'Poll: Americans' views on same-sex marriage', 
Accessed 10 November 2015 from http://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-americans-views-on-same-sex- 
marriage/ ; Clement and Barnes, 'Poll: Gay Marriage Support at Record High', Accessed 10 November 2015 
from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/poll-gay-marriage-support-at-record- 
high/2015/04/22/f6548332-e92a-11e4-aae1-d642717d8afa_story.html?utm_term=.7ca69d88a04a 
Accessed 01 November 2015
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only half as likely as straight youth to say that they are happy. 92% of LGBTIAQ youth say that they 
hear negative things about being LGBTIAQ. That said, 75% of LGBTIAQ youth think that most of their 
peers do not disapprove of their LGBTIAQ identities.2 The remaining work to be done in combating 
homophobia can also be seen from the institutionalised anti-LGBTIAQ prejudice that can be found in 
many countries (for example, homosexuality is still illegal in 75 countries, mainly in Africa and Asia, 
and carries the death penalty in five3).
The phenomenon commonly termed homophobia is thus still a concern which needs to be 
addressed -  and one which is being addressed. This thesis, while it does not directly suggest a new 
way of engaging with homophobia, lays the groundwork for a picture which has implications for how 
we continue to engage in the area.
i. Terminological concerns.
The relevant literature around the phenomenon has raised concerns about the term "homophobia". 
As G.M. Herek4 suggests, the term "homophobia," by making it sound like anti-LGBTIAQ attitudes and 
beliefs are a form of irrational fear, makes it seem as though homophobia is a form of pathology. 
Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that acts, beliefs or attitudes which are traditionally 
labelled homophobic are often directed at people who do not necessarily fall under the label of 
homosexuality -  bisexuality, asexuality, pansexuality, intersexuality and transgender people, for 
example, are also the targets of prejudice. People are targeted both for their sexual orientations and 
their gender identities, and the two are often related. Stereotypes about gay men, for example, tend 
to include gender identity -  gay men are seen as feminine, and this is seen as negative.
An alternative to the term "homophobia" is "heterosexism". Generally, though, 
"heterosexism has referred to societal-level ideologies and patterns of institutionalized oppression of 
non-heterosexual people."5 I am not only concerned with anti-LGBTIAQ ideology -  I think negative 
attitudes towards the LGBTIAQ community are equally important.
As opposed to either "homophobia" or "heterosexism", Herek suggests the term "sexual 
prejudice." He uses it specifically to refer to prejudice against people who are homosexual and
2 Unknown author, 'Growing up LGBTI in America: View Statistics', Accessed 10 November 2015 from 
http://www.hrc.org/youth/view-statistics/#.WJyswn9MiBl
3 Accessed 01 November 2016 from
https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiJss
yc44PSAhUKOsAKHZBSBI4QFggYMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fold.ilga.org%2FStatehomophobia%2FILGA_State_S
ponsored_Homophobia_2015.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGNXQnPuX0O5vdhCXQ-IvlnissJnw&sig2=_TqadIVRaDM-
IfRlIDPBEw&bvm=bv.146496531,d.d24
4 Herek, 'The Psychology of Sexual Prejudice', p. 19
5 Herek, 'The Psychology of Sexual Prejudice', p. 19
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bisexual, but I think the label is broad enough to cover the other actions, beliefs and attitudes which 
traditionally fall under the label "homophobia". I think that this broader label is the most appropriate 
of the three available. This is partly because of the limits of both of the other terms. It is also partly 
because of the fact that beliefs, attitudes and actions labelled homophobic apply to people both on 
the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity, or a combination of the two. That said, the 
examples I use will be predominantly of prejudice against homosexual people. I am concerned that 
there may be differences in the explanatory frameworks that make sense of, for example, transphobia. 
I think there are likely to be elements in common, but it is possible that not everything I say will apply 
to all forms of sexual prejudice. I will use the term "sexual prejudice" given the problematisation of 
the terms "homophobia" and "heterosexism", but I will use it in a relatively narrow sense, to refer to 
prejudice against gay and lesbian people. This is not because I think the other forms of sexual prejudice 
are not important, but because I am concerned that I may accidentally skate over subtleties of people's 
lived experiences by trying to make blanket claims about all kinds of sexual prejudice. I think that a lot 
of what I say will still apply, but there is work that needs to be done in looking at where the experiences 
of people who have been on the receiving end of sexual prejudice converges, and where it diverges. I 
do not want to lump the groups together and miss important differences. Bisexual people face bi­
erasure, for example. Bisexual and transgender people in particular face prejudice both from the 
heterosexual and homosexual communities. In terms of the kinds of sexual prejudice I have included, 
one might argue that I am still lumping groups with different lived experiences together. The gender 
differences between gay men and lesbian women do play a role in their lived experiences. I think there 
is enough in common, however, that I can talk about homosexual people as a group. As I have said, I 
do think that what I say has implications for sexual prejudice against other groups as well -  I just do 
not want to skip over what may be important differences.
Finally, it is not yet clear from the preceding discussion what sexual prejudice actually consists 
in, though I have been using a commonsense understanding of the term. For the moment, I will say 
that I am looking at individual prejudice, rather than structural prejudice. I think that there are two 
components associated with individual sexual prejudice (and, in fact, prejudice more generally, though 
I will continue to speak about sexual prejudice specifically). These components are negative beliefs -  
negative beliefs about people of certain sexual orientations, the moral status of LGBTIAQ people, etc. 
-  and negative attitudes and/or affective states directed at people on the basis of their sexuality. I will, 
however, discuss the question of what sexual prejudice actually consists in in more detail in Chapter 
2. Having described the outline of my thesis, and clarified the term "sexual prejudice", I will move on 
to the main body of my argument.
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Chapter 1: Confirmation Bias in its Different Forms.
It is evident that there is a phenomenon that takes place when people engage in debates and 
disagreements, whether political, moral or even factual. It is common, and it is fairly likely that we 
have all experienced it at one point or another. Sometimes, when two people are arguing for points 
that contradict one another, they end up talking past each other. Each ostensibly listens to the other, 
each gives reasons and evidence for her claim -  and yet nothing seems to register. The other person's 
evidence seems weak, or does not seem to count as proper evidence at all. In the end, the debate 
often does not go anywhere. This description captures an extreme form of a pattern that I think can 
be seen in disagreement, and it is this extreme form that I am interested in, because it is the clearest 
(and I think a common) instance of how a particular phenomenon -  confirmation bias -  impacts on 
our everyday disagreements.
To use a concrete example, debates about the ethical status of homosexuality and sexual 
prejudice often (though not always) progress along these lines.6 Often when two people or groups 
have a discussion about homosexuality, each presents the other with reasons for their own position -  
homosexuality is ethically unproblematic or homosexuality is wrong -  and each seems to listen to the 
other (in some cases this is not true, but that is a different phenomenon). Despite this, neither 
responds to the evidence the other presents. Neither is the slightest bit convinced -  partly because 
they are not responding to the other's evidence as the other does. Person A argues that there is 
nothing wrong with homosexuality. She might think that it is not unnatural - it is found in other species. 
She may believe that people cannot choose who they fall in love with, that love is a good thing, 
whether between a straight couple or not. She might believe that gay couples are as likely to be faithful 
and happy as straight ones. She likely does believe that it is wrong to be sexually prejudiced because 
it involves discrimination. Person B might argue that homosexuality goes against God's will. She might 
think that children of gay parents are more likely to have a tough time at school. She might argue that 
it is unnatural in that people were not designed to be homosexual (whether by a deity or by evolution). 
People on either side of the debate may have a combination of these views, or completely different 
ones -  these are merely examples of possible beliefs that they may have. Neither Person A nor Person 
B, however, takes the other one's evidence as being good, though both think that their own evidence 
is conclusive. Each is critical of the other's evidence or, in some cases, they "just don't buy" it. Often 
they interpret evidence differently -  for example, Person A might think children of gay parents having 
a tough time at school is proof that sexual prejudice is wrong and harmful, rather than that
6 I'm talking about homosexuality rather than using more inclusive terms for the sake of expediency, but what I 
say should apply to the rest of the LGBTIAQ community as well.
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homosexuality is. Person B, on the other hand, might interpret this as evidence that gay couples do 
not prepare their children well for school life. The debate does not end with consensus, but with each 
person still firmly convinced that she is right.
I suspect that what is happening in these cases is that each of the participants is engaging in a 
phenomenon called confirmation bias.7 There have been experiments within social psychology that 
explore this broad psychological phenomenon. Two in particular stand out -  an experiment done by 
Wason in the early 1960s, and a later experiment done by Lord, Ross and Lepper. Each of these is a 
paradigmatic example of one of two main ways of approaching confirmation bias -  each of which picks 
out different possible elements of the phenomenon, and each of which has different concerns about 
what we are doing wrong when we are being affected by it.8 I am focusing on these two experiments 
because they seem to embody the two main trends in the experiments to do with confirmation bias. 
Other experiments tend to be similar to these two, many are based off these original designs, and they 
often reference one or both of them. I think that the main difference between the two trends is that 
the first kind -  the one exemplified by the Wason experiment -  tends to focus on the kind of 
information we look for when we are testing hypotheses that we hold. The second -  the one 
exemplified by the Lord, Ross and Lepper experiment -  tends to be more relevant to the way we 
engage with evidence that we already have, or that we are presented with.
Roughly, confirmation bias refers to a tendency to look for evidence which confirms rather 
than disconfirms one's original hypothesis or beliefs about a particular subject, and to often accept 
that evidence with little critical thought. Closely related to this is what has been referred to as the 
disconfirmation bias -  the tendency to avoid disconfirming evidence when one can, and to react to 
disconfirming evidence far more critically than to confirming evidence. Lord, Ross and Lepper, for 
example, found that we tend to think that studies which support our views about a topic (capital 
punishment in their case) are better designed and implemented than studies which contradict our 
initial beliefs. Confirmation bias and disconfirmation bias are closely interrelated, and I suspect that in 
practice they often occur together.
7 They may be doing so to greater or lesser extents, and one of them may still be right.
8 Nickerson, 'Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises.' For examples of the Wason-type 
experiments, see Levine, M. (1970). Human discrimination learning. The subset-sampling assumption. 
Psychological Bulletin, 74, 397-404.; Millward, R. B., & Spoehr, K. T. (1973). The direct measurement of 
hypothesis-testing strategies. Cognitive Psychology, 4, 1-38.; Tweney, R. D., Doherty, M. E., Worner, W. J., 
Pliske, D. B., Mynatt, C. R., Gross, K. A., & Arkkelin, D. L. (1980). Strategies of rule discovery in an inference 
task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32, 109-123.; For the Lord, Ross and Lepper-type 
experiments, see, for example, Pitz, G. F, Downing, L., & Reinhold, H. (1967). Sequential effects in the revision 
of subjective probabilities. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 21,381-393, as well as literature around Kardash, 
C.M. and Scholes, R.J. (1996). Effects of preexisting beliefs, epistemological beliefs, and need for cognition on 
interpretation of controversial issues. Journal of Educational Psychology, 88(2) -  260-271.
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1.1. The Phenomena
It seems to me that the experiments that have been described as illustrating confirmation bias are 
actually illustrating several different sub-phenomena. Each has, as a broad purpose, the confirmation 
of initially formed responses to a situation, or previously held beliefs.9 In this section, I will discuss the 
two different experiments, and draw out the sub-phenomena that I think are present in them.
1.2. The Wason Experiment.
The experiment that best illustrates the first approach to confirmation bias is one which was done by 
Wason in 1960. In this experiment, participants were given a set of three numbers. Their task was to 
try and find the rule that governed the number sequence, by giving sets of three numbers and being 
told whether or not they fit the rule. The initial number series was 2, 4, 6, and the rule was "three 
numbers in increasing order of magnitude." Wason found that generally, once people had an idea of 
what the rule might be (most assumed it was three consecutive multiples of two), many of them would 
test this by offering further sets of numbers that fit this rule (in other words, they looked for confirming 
evidence). A statistically significant number did not look for disconfirming evidence -  i.e. try a number 
series that did not fit the rule they were thinking of. Furthermore, when they were told that their first 
rule was wrong, they tended to try rules that were really just adaptations or re-interpretations of the 
first one, rather than trying a radically different view. They would, for example, ask whether the second 
number was double the first and two thirds of the third. The second rule participants tested usually 
described the number sequence in such a way that the numbers involved would again explain the thing 
that had struck them at first -  the fact that the numbers given were multiples of two. Wason 
hypothesises that "[i]t seems likely that in these cases the subjects cannot change their concepts (as 
judged by their instances) but change their description of them. Changing the description of a rule 
makes them think they have changed the rule itself: a verbal adjustment is made to satisfy the demand 
for a different hypothesis."
Wason's picture of confirmation bias lays out several different phenomena that fall under, or 
are related to, the broad description of confirmation bias.
Phenomenon 1: The most prominent aspect of the phenomenon Wason describes is the one 
which most basically deserves the label "confirmation bias". When faced with a task that involves 
gathering evidence about a particular hypothesis, we have a tendency to look for evidence that
9 I mean this fairly loosely. I think the holding onto one's initial responses or previously held beliefs is what 
justifies the label confirmation bias, although I will want to be fairly specific later on about which kind I am 
interested in and why.
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confirms our initial hypothesis and avoid, or at least fail to look for, information which disconfirms it. 
When one engages in this phenomenon, one is tending to look for evidence to support one's initial 
impression or belief (in the Wason case, the fact that what one was initially struck by in the number 
series was that it took the form of multiples of two). One tends, I suppose, to not think of looking for 
disconfirming evidence, even though this is as necessary to testing a theory as confirming evidence.
Phenomenon 2: Wason's criticism of his participants' interpretation of evidence suggests that 
people have a tendency to focus on confirming evidence to the point where they struggle to consider 
that their initial hypothesis was false. At the very least, they do not do so through their own gathering 
of evidence. If we are continually looking for evidence which supports our own claims, and never for 
evidence which challenges it, then we run the risk of missing important falsifying10 evidence. If one 
looks for only supporting evidence for a belief to a large enough extent, then there is less chance that 
any epistemic process will cause one to give up that belief. Taken to extremes, this can mean that we 
are actually unable to get to a point where we can consider that our initial hypotheses might be wrong. 
I doubt, however, that beliefs of the kind dealt with in Wason's experiment are likely to become 
completely immune to counter-evidence. The participants' beliefs changed, for example, when the 
participants were told what the actual number series was. The experiment is pointing more towards a 
tendency to be unable to give up on our initial hypotheses.
Phenomenon 1 and phenomenon 2 are so closely related as to be almost indistinguishable. 
The more we look only for confirming evidence, and avoid disconfirming evidence, the less likely we 
are to prove our initial hypotheses wrong. Phenomenon 2 is essentially the state that one could get 
into if one took phenomenon 1 too far. I have kept these as separate phenomena, because it is possible 
to engage in phenomenon 1 without necessarily falling into phenomenon 2. The participants in the 
Wason case demonstrated this in the sense that they responded to being told their initial hypothesis 
was wrong with varying degrees of adaptability -  some did change their approach, some took longer. 
They were not uniformly focused on confirming evidence, and, depending on how strong their 
tendency towards phenomenon 1 was, they were varying distances away from phenomenon 2. The 
two phenomena are parts of the same process, but distinct enough to make it worthwhile to talk about 
them separately.
Phenomenon 3: The experiment also shows a tendency to use induction to form beliefs about 
the world. The participants tended to initially check sequences that would confirm their initial 
hypothesis. They showed a tendency to prefer a manner of inquiry that was based on making 
predictions from positive evidence, rather than on one which emphasised testing hypotheses against 
disconfirming evidence. This worried Wason, who argued that "the experiment demonstrates the
10 I am using the term "falsify" here simply to mean "prove to be false" and not in any technical sense.
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dangers of induction by simple enumeration as a means of discovering truth. In real life there is no 
authority to pronounce judgement on inferences: the inferences can only be checked against the 
evidence."11 This effect is heightened by our reluctance to falsify our initially held beliefs or 
hypotheses. We often base our conclusions on induction from evidence, but we tend to only look for 
confirming evidence. Again, this is very close to what is happening in phenomenon 1. One can, 
however, form beliefs based on induction, and still look for disconfirming evidence. The belief-forming 
process is, in this case, still inductive, but it is also tested by looking for disconfirming evidence. A belief 
being based on an inference from positive evidence is not the same thing as only looking for positive 
evidence. The tendency towards looking for confirming evidence without looking for disconfirming 
evidence as well is what makes induction problematic. It means that the hypothesis-testing process -  
whether inductive or not -  is biased towards the initial hypothesis of the believer.
There are two elements to confirmation in the context of disagreement or inquiry. The first is 
to do with your aim -  confirm a hypothesis, in a broad, not necessarily scientific sense. Ideally this 
hypothesis should be open to change if one discovers that it does not explain what it is trying to. The 
second is to do with the kind of evidence you might have. So, you can have confirming evidence -  
positive evidence that confirms your hypothesis -  and disconfirming evidence against opposing 
positions, which would in some cases support your own conclusion. Positive evidence can also cause 
us to form views about the world in the absence of an initial hypothesis, but in the cases I am interested 
in we do have initial hypotheses. Inductive evidence just is confirming evidence, and can be used to 
support a hypothesis. So if my hypothesis is that gay people are more likely to be unfaithful than 
straight people, every observation of a gay couple where a partner has been unfaithful is a piece of 
confirming evidence -  and thus a piece of evidence for the inductive belief. So in terms of phenomena 
1-3, phenomenon 1 consists of a tendency to gather confirming evidence for our hypotheses, rather 
than disconfirming evidence. Phenomenon 2 is to do with the extent to which we engage in 
phenomenon 1 -  it occurs when we gather confirming evidence for our initial hypothesis to the extent 
that we barely test that hypothesis against disconfirming evidence, or do not do so at all. Phenomenon 
3 is part of what motivates phenomenon 1, and part of what leads to phenomenon 2. Induction 
involves forming beliefs based on positive evidence, so a tendency towards induction brings with it a 
tendency towards looking for confirming evidence. If we focus too much on the confirming evidence, 
however, we fail to test our hypotheses against disconfirming evidence, and end up engaging in 
phenomenon 2.
Wason's criticism of confirmation bias suggests a view of human inquiry that is fairly rational 
and neutral. His discussion is focused primarily on the kind of epistemic state we ought to be in when
11 Wason, 'On the failure to eliminate hypotheses in a conceptual task', p. 139
9
we are engaged in inquiry that is analogous to scientific inquiry. He also thinks, however, that the main 
quality he picks out as being important for good scientific inquiry - "a willingness to attempt to falsify 
hypotheses, and thus to test those intuitive ideas which so often carry the feeling of certitude"12 - is 
just as important for other kinds of thinking. On his picture, then, when we are engaged in inquiry -  
even, or perhaps especially, about topics where we are confident of our hypotheses -  we ought to 
cultivate a disposition to try and test our intuitions by looking for disconfirming evidence. In addition, 
we should be willing to radically change the ideas we are working with if it turns out that they are 
wrong. I am not sure I fully agree with this picture, though I do up to a point. I do think a certain 
responsiveness to evidence is important for our beliefs, but I think phrasing it in terms of straight 
falsifiability would be to oversimplify the factors that affect our beliefs. I would want to qualify it by 
saying that we can be motivated to hold on to beliefs in the face of some contradictory evidence, 
depending on the belief and the evidence. I argue later in this thesis that we need to strike a balance 
between giving up beliefs too easily in the light of disconfirming evidence, and not giving them up in 
response to evidence that should cause us to change the belief in question. We need to strike a 
balance between naive acceptance of any disconfirming evidence and a kind of rigidity that causes our 
beliefs to remain too fixed.
Phenomenon 4: Wason's experiment also shows a problematic tendency to be narrow-minded 
when trying to solve problems. Given his discussion of how people tend to continue to guess at rules 
that are conceptually equivalent to the first one they guessed, his experiment points to a feature of 
human inquiry that is fairly limiting. He does not directly discuss this, but it is not an unreasonable 
supposition to make. Sometimes, in order for inquiry to advance, the inquirers need to think in ways 
different to the usual patterns of inquiry. Perhaps more importantly, when one's initial concept has 
been proven inadequate, one should try and move onto another one - a move Wason's experiment 
suggests might be quite difficult to do. New and creative ideas are much harder to come by if one's 
thinking is constrained by earlier hypotheses. This is not limited to looking for confirmation of one's 
existing beliefs. Though this is one way in which it might play out, I am rather drawing attention to the 
tendency to work in the patterns one is used to, even when they have been shown to be ineffective.
Phenomenon 5: Idee fixe. The term idee fixe has been used in various ways, but all I mean by 
it is "holding a belief steady in the face of contrary evidence." This is the kind of phenomenon that 
can occur when my beliefs cause me to form an expectation about how the world will behave, which 
is then not met. I might, for example, expect that when I encounter the children of a gay couple, they 
will be unhappy. When that expectation is not met -  I meet the children of a gay couple and they are 
very happy and well-adjusted -  I have two options. I can give up on my belief -  that having same-sex
12Wason, 'On the failure to eliminate hypotheses in a conceptual task', p. 139
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parents is harmful to children. Alternatively, I can try and explain the evidence away by arguing that 
the conditions in the world interfered with the evidence in some way, or by moving to a more general 
belief, such as "the children of most gay couples will be unhappy". I might think, for example, that the 
children's grandparents were very involved in their upbringing, and this is causing them to be happier 
than they would otherwise have been. This latter course seems to involve holding the basic negative 
belief about homosexual parents steady. I think that both the Wason experiment and the Lord, Ross 
and Lepper experiment, which I will speak about in the next section, show this phenomenon. In the 
Wason experiment, the beliefs were held fixed by seeking confirming evidence, and by avoiding 
disconfirming evidence. In addition, if the beliefs in question were held to be unfalsifiable, it would be 
a sign that they were being held steady -  a sign that they were fixed in some way.
1.3. The Lord, Ross and Lepper Experiment
Another paradigmatic study within social psychology that falls under the label confirmation bias is the 
one done by Lord, Ross and Lepper. It focused on people who had strong views on either side of the 
debate about capital punishment. Lord, Ross and Lepper gave them fake studies with mixed 
conclusions on the effectiveness of capital punishment. The study aimed to see what the effect of the 
studies on their views would be. In this study, participants who either supported or opposed capital 
punishment were presented with two fictitious studies. One gave evidence that capital punishment 
was effective in reducing the number of homicides committed in states that introduced capital 
punishment. The other gave evidence that homicides actually increased after it was introduced. 
Afterwards, both the participants' reactions to the studies, as well as their views on capital punishment 
were examined. Lord, Ross and Lepper found that a phenomenon called belief polarization had 
occurred -  people who had initially supported capital punishment supported it even more strongly, 
and vice versa. Exposure to the same inconclusive evidence had lead the participants to opposite 
conclusions -  and those conclusions were determined by the views the participants had going into the 
study. In addition, when evaluating the studies, participants tended to evaluate the studies that 
supported their conclusions as being better designed, carried out, and more convincing than studies 
that opposed their pre-existing views. It is worth noting that the participants displayed a tendency to 
engage carefully with opposing evidence -  but only with the intention of criticising it, however 
unconscious they were that this was their main intention. They may or may not have thought that they 
were sincerely engaging with the evidence.
Phenomenon 6: Lord, Ross and Lepper found that their participants were much more critical 
of disconfirming evidence than of confirming evidence, evaluating the experiments that contradicted 
their views as being more poorly designed and implemented than the studies which confirmed their
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beliefs. Participants tended to confirm their initial beliefs, through a focus on why opposing evidence 
was faulty. They were hyper-critical of opposing evidence, and not critical enough of confirming 
evidence. This could apply quite easily to the debate between Person A and Person B described above. 
The Lord, Ross and Lepper study suggests that someone who is sexually prejudiced, for example, is 
likely to be more critical of any empirical studies or arguments that support the view that 
homosexuality is not harmful. Someone arguing that homosexuality is fine, on the other hand, is more 
likely to be very critical of evidence that claims that homosexuality is harmful. I will call this 
phenomenon hyper-criticality.
Phenomenon 6 is linked to phenomenon 2 (the inability to accept challenges to one's claims) 
in that it appears to be a way in which phenomenon 2 happens. If we do not question confirming 
evidence and are very harsh on disconfirming evidence, it is less likely that we are going to be able to 
give up on our initial hypotheses. That said, phenomenon 6 does seem to be a separate phenomenon. 
Either can, after all, occur without the other. Our claims can become immune to counter-evidence if 
we simply never look for disconfirming evidence, and we can be asymmetrically critical of evidence 
without it leading to the claims in question being entirely unresponsive to evidence.
Phenomenon 7: one of the most interesting elements of Lord, Ross and Lepper's study was 
the demonstration of belief polarization. Lord, Ross and Lepper found that their participants not only 
did not change their beliefs in response to disconfirming evidence. They also tended to end up with 
stronger views at the end of their engagement with the evidence than they had at the beginning of it. 
It seems as though the fact that they were interpreting the opposing evidence as flawed, was 
strengthening the participants' own beliefs. It seemed that people were "allowing themselves to be 
encouraged by patterns of data that they ought to have found troubling."13 Concerns with 
disconfirming evidence were being used to justify the views that the evidence opposed -  and this is 
problematic. The Lord, Ross and Lepper study suggests that in the case of Person A and Person B, each 
participant might end up with polarized beliefs, but there is also a possibility that they will not.
Finally, I think that phenomenon 5, idee fixe, is also present in the Lord, Ross and Lepper 
experiment. The participants expected that the evidence would support their initial belief. When it 
did not they were faced with a choice between re-examining their beliefs and finding ways of 
describing apparent counter-evidence as still supporting their conclusion. They chose the latter, by 
holding the disconfirming evidence to be bad. They were presented with contradictory evidence, but 
held onto their initial belief anyway. I think that idee fixe is, in a way, the central phenomenon of Lord, 
Ross and Lepper's experiment, to an even greater extent than it is for the Wason one. I take it that the
13 Lord, Ross and Lepper, 'Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization', p. 2107
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point of hyper-criticality is to hold fixed one's initial belief.14 In the Wason case, I suspect idee fixe is 
less pronounced than in the Lord, Ross and Lepper one. Wason's participants held their initial 
impression steady, and mostly looked for confirming evidence, but their actual engagement with the 
available evidence was not affected. In the Lord, Ross and Lepper case, hyper-criticality affected not 
what evidence the participants looked for, but how they actually engaged with that evidence. The 
Wason case shows a problematic tendency in our ways of going about finding evidence, but the Lord, 
Ross and Lepper case is in at least one way more worrying -  it shows that even when we do have 
evidence, we might not always engage with it particularly virtuously.15 Lord, Ross and Lepper are 
concerned not about the tendency to interpret evidence in the light of previously held beliefs, but in 
the tendency for that evidence to then be used to back up the beliefs that were causing it to be 
interpreted in a biased manner in the first place. They base their interpretation of their experiment 
on a view of human inquiry that gives credit to the need for it to be embedded in the inquirer's view 
of, and knowledge about, the world. They focus on the way in which people have to make sense of 
the world from a perspective which by its nature must be influenced by previous knowledge and 
previous ideas. On this picture, we would need to be aware that we are always bringing a history of 
learning and understanding to bear on any inquiry we embark on. It is important, however, that we 
do not let that background of already-held views shape inquiry to the extent where it becomes too 
rigid to take new information into account, or where it fails to be responsive to evidence that it really 
should be responding to. This would mean that phenomena 6 and 7, at least, are undesirable. Hyper­
criticality means that we are letting our background beliefs take control over our interpretation of 
evidence to the extent where we cannot properly engage with it. In the Lord, Ross and Lepper study, 
participants engaged differently with disconfirming studies and confirming studies, even though the 
studies were designed to be equally convincing. Polarisation is also problematic. Our already-held 
beliefs must influence how we interpret evidence (though not to the extent that occurs in 
phenomenon 6), but polarisation indicates that we are letting those initial beliefs dictate completely 
how we respond to contradictory evidence, and that is problematic.
Lord, Ross and Lepper demonstrate what I take to be a very real problem in inquiry. In order 
to be effective epistemic agents, we need to have some beliefs about the world. We cannot approach 
new information about a topic from a completely blank-slate position. If we are to engage with
14I do think idee fixe can occur without hyper-criticality. One can use methods other than hyper-criticality to 
explain away evidence (for example, saying the experiment was well designed, but that conditions interfered 
with the results -  so, "I met children of gay parents and they were happy, but their grandparents help so 
much...", for example.
15 In a later chapter, I do discuss epistemic virtue and how one can see confirmation bias through its lens.
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evidence, we need to use the tools16 and beliefs we already have at our disposal to interpret that 
evidence. At the same time, this makes us much more likely to engage in the phenomena.
1.4. How do they link up?
Each of these studies is an example of the broad phenomenon of confirmation bias -  the tendency to 
evaluate evidence in such a way that it confirms the views one already has about the topic in question. 
Each of them, however, pick up on different aspects of both confirmation bias and disconfirmation 
bias. I suspect that this might be partly a result of the experiments' designs, and partly a result of the 
topics that were used to test confirmation bias. In the Wason experiment, the evidence was not open 
to the kind of interpretation that seems necessary for the disconfirmation bias to be fully at play, but 
gave the participants the task of finding new evidence (whether confirming or disconfirming). The 
Lord, Ross and Lepper experiment, however, allowed for interpretation of the evidence, but that 
evidence was provided -  the participants did not have a choice about what evidence to look for.
Normative claims play more of a role in Lord, Ross and Lepper's picture than in Wason's. 
Wason's experiment is to do with testing mathematical hypotheses. It is focused on more scientific or 
factual beliefs than Lord, Ross and Lepper's. Lord, Ross and Lepper explore the realm of normative and 
ethical belief, dealing with capital punishment and the moral implications of the death penalty. I do 
think that Wason's phenomena might have implications for normative beliefs -  including ethical beliefs 
such as the ones that Lord, Ross and Lepper were working with, as well as the kind of sexually 
prejudiced beliefs that I am interested in. The tendency to seek confirming evidence, for example, has 
implications for how we might go about the project of forming and/or critically engaging with our 
ethical beliefs. The possible overlaps are not, however, really relevant to the particular cases I am 
interested in exploring -  cases where people are presented with evidence or argument, and respond 
to it differently based on whether it supports their existing beliefs or not. The cases I am most 
interested in are cases where we have beliefs that do not change in the face of counter argument or 
counter-evidence. Neither Person A and Person B's beliefs, nor the Lord, Ross and Lepper participants' 
beliefs changed. It is the engagement with evidence that interests me, rather than the tendency to 
look only for confirming evidence. In the cases I am thinking of, the evidence is already available. It is 
just that its impact is not being allowed by the agent.
16 Possibly including heuristics and associations -  they are not always justified, but we do need to use them at 
least to some extent. Navigating the world would be too hard otherwise.
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1.5. What does this say about argument and debate?
Given the preceding discussion of confirmation bias, in the form of the phenomena described above, 
it may be useful to return to the example I gave at the start of this chapter. We need to consider the 
effect of the phenomena on our debates about ethical issues -  debates which have to happen, 
because these issues affect people's lives. Where there is conflict about ethical issues, people need to 
talk to each other. If there is to be any kind of constructive progress in areas such as prejudice, 
discussions need to be opened up and the issues need to be engaged with.
The preceding discussion, however, suggests that there may be challenges to engaging in 
constructive debate about such issues. When we engage in debates about ethics, we have a tendency 
to engage in the phenomena described above. This is problematic because it suggests that debates 
will often end with as much -  or more -  dissent than they started with. Social psychology suggests 
that ethical debates are likely to be prone to phenomena 5 and 6 at least, and possibly 7 as well. This 
applies to debates about the ethical status of homosexuality as well. It is, after all, a topic in a similar 
vein to discussions about capital punishment, although perhaps one that is relevant to a wider number 
of people. These three phenomena (idee fixe, hyper-criticality and polarisation) are the ones that I 
think have the most interesting effect on the example of debates about homosexuality.
So we go into a debate about homosexuality already convinced that we have the right beliefs. 
When we are presented with counter-arguments, we tend to engage in hyper-criticality. We are very 
critical of the alternative position's arguments, and tend to pay much less attention to our own. This 
does not, of course, mean that it is not the case that one of us has a better view than the other. In 
cases of prejudice we are certainly going to want to say this is the case, but it is worth noting that 
either "side" of the debate is equally prone to the phenomena. We argue, each engaging very critically 
with the other's argument. The sexually prejudiced person, for example, might be very critical of 
evidence that gay couples raise healthy children. She might argue that the studies are unconvincing 
or biased from the start. People who are against sexual prejudice, on the other hand, might argue that 
evidence showing that the children of gay couples are unhappy is a result of societal prejudice rather 
than bad parenting, and that the studies in question fail to recognise this. We might, when engaging 
with the other person's evidence engage in idee fixe -  the sexually prejudiced person might, for 
example, consistently interpret evidence of good parenting skills among gay couples as being the 
result of particularities of each situation rather than of an ability for childrearing that is able to be 
shared by parents of any sexuality. At the end of this debate, neither of us is convinced -  in fact, it is 
possible that we might each end up with views that are even more strongly entrenched than they 
were before.
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I think that this is a problem that is wider than just the debate about homosexuality. The 
phenomena I have been describing are not an isolated fact about some people. I think the experiments 
I have discussed, as well as some of the other literature on confirmation bias17, show that they are 
something that we tend to engage in as epistemic agents. Though I am focusing in this thesis on how 
these tendencies play out in the particular case of sexually prejudiced beliefs, this is something that I 
think affects all of us, in various ways. I will explore this more fully in the next chapter, arguing that by 
virtue of how our belief systems work, we hold beliefs fixed -  engage in idee fixe -  relatively 
frequently. Given the reasons above, which suggest that it is actually the Lord, Ross and Lepper 
experiment that I am interested in, I will limit myself to discussing those three -  idee fixe, hyper­
criticality, and polarisation. Finally, because I think that idee fixe is the central phenomenon of the 
Lord, Ross and Lepper experiment, I will be looking at it as the main phenomenon that I am trying to 
explain, though I will discuss the other two as well.
17 Nickerson, 'Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises.' For examples of the Wason-type 
experiments, see Levine, M. (1970). Human discrimination learning. The subset-sampling assumption. 
Psychological Bulletin, 74, 397-404.; Millward, R. B., & Spoehr, K. T. (1973). The direct measurement of 
hypothesis-testing strategies. Cognitive Psychology, 4, 1-38.; Tweney, R. D., Doherty, M. E., Worner, W. J., 
Pliske, D. B., Mynatt, C. R., Gross, K. A., & Arkkelin, D. L. (1980). Strategies of rule discovery in an inference 
task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32, 109-123.; For the Lord, Ross and Lepper-type 
experiments, see, for example, Pitz, G. F, Downing, L., & Reinhold, H. (1967). Sequential effects in the revision 
of subjective probabilities. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 21,381-393, as well as literature around Kardash, 
C.M. and Scholes, R.J. (1996). Effects of preexisting beliefs, epistemological beliefs, and need for cognition on 
interpretation of controversial issues. Journal of Educational Psychology, 88(2) -  260-271.
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Chapter 2: The Motivational Story behind the Phenomena
In the previous chapter, I argued that one of the things that might be happening in cases where people 
are arguing about something like homosexuality, is that each of the participants in the argument may 
be engaging in confirmation bias. The social psychology experiments on confirmation bias use the term 
"confirmation bias" as though it were a single thing. I argued, however, that the umbrella term 
"confirmation bias" actually gets applied to a combination of phenomena, which tend to happen 
together. Social psychology experiments show two main trends, groupings of phenomena, one 
exemplified by the Wason experiment, and the other by the Lord, Ross and Lepper experiment. The 
latter includes the phenomena idee fixe (holding beliefs steady), hyper-criticality (being over-critical of 
contrary evidence, and under-critical of supporting evidence) and polarisation (coming to hold a belief 
more steadily in the face of mixed or contrary evidence). I think that these phenomena are the ones 
which are most relevant to the kind of beliefs I am interested in -  fixed beliefs in a prejudicial context 
-  and so will be focusing on these three in the following chapters.
In this chapter, I will tease out the motivations we have for holding steady certain beliefs. 
Though I use the term "motivations", and speak about the factors I point to as such, I do not mean that 
they are conscious. I think the factors that I discuss in this chapter motivate certain responses to 
evidence, but that they do so unconsciously. They do not lead to intentional choices about what to 
believe, or what evidence to take on board, but they affect the way we do engage with evidence. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to spell out exactly how beliefs and evidence-responsiveness are 
affected by motivations on a micro-level -  i.e. the actual psychological or neurological path by which 
the one affects the other. I will, however, discuss the general factors that I think can motivate the 
phenomena.
Before I discuss the relevant motivating factors, however, I will return briefly to sexual 
prejudice, and what it might be. In the introduction, I suggested that we tend to think there are roughly 
two components to prejudice, including sexual prejudice -  namely an attitude-based component, and 
a belief-based component. In this chapter, I will discuss this in more detail, arguing that sexual 
prejudice can involve either, or both, of these components while still counting as sexual prejudice. The 
beliefs I am interested in, then, can be present in cases of sexual prejudice which involve only beliefs, 
and in cases which involve both attitudes and beliefs. It will become clear in the chapter that I think 
that they are more likely to be found in cases where the person in question has negative attitudes as 
well as negative beliefs, but this is an empirical question, which I will not go into in any detail. After 
discussing sexual prejudice, I will argue that the holding steady of sexually prejudiced beliefs is a 
particular, problematic instantiation of a general tendency. I will argue that this tendency is a result of
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how our beliefs fit together with each other, and with our affective and attitudinal aspects. I think that 
W.V. Quine's picture of belief is a useful tool for understanding idee fixe and hyper-criticality, but that 
it does not explain polarisation. I will briefly try to give an alternative account of what might be 
happening in the case of this phenomenon. Finally, I will argue that, while Quine's picture does make 
some sense of why we might be motivated to engage in the phenomena, it does not fully capture non- 
epistemic factors which impact on them -  namely emotions, attitudes, and values. I will explore how 
they might have an effect on the beliefs I am interested in, and thus how they relate to the phenomena.
2.1. What is sexual prejudice?
When one thinks about prejudice in general and sexual prejudice more specifically, there are two 
things which might come to mind. I think that there are two different possible elements of sexual 
prejudice -  beliefs and attitudes. In terms of beliefs, if I am prejudiced, I might have beliefs about the 
superiority of one group and/or the inferiority of another. If I am racist, I probably believe certain 
things to do with the intelligence or moral standing of certain racial groups. If I am sexually prejudiced, 
I might have beliefs about the moral status of homosexual people, or the impact on children that 
same-sex parenting has. In terms of attitudes, if I am prejudiced, it is likely that I have negative 
attitudes towards people of the group I am prejudiced against. These may be strong -  hatred, for 
example, or disgust -  but they may also be more subtle and less extreme -  I may simply be 
uncomfortable around members of that group.
Beliefs are, I take it, just propositions that one holds to be true. Attitudes are more difficult to 
get a grip on. An attitude towards something can best be described as a disposition to act and feel in 
certain ways and believe certain things. So "[a] person with a certain attitude toward something S (a 
particular or kind of object, property or event) will be, among other things, attentive to certain 
features of S, inclined to describe or understand S in certain ways, disposed to feel certain emotions 
toward S, disposed to certain beliefs toward S, disposed to praise or blame S in certain conditions, and 
disposed to act in certain ways toward S."18 If I have respectful, trusting and friendly attitudes towards 
someone, for example, I will be disposed to believe the best of them, to feel sad or angry if they are 
harmed, to expect them to have my interests in mind to some extent, etc.
I will argue that it is possible for each of these elements to occur within sexual prejudice 
without the other -  so someone might have sexually prejudiced beliefs -  a sexually prejudiced 
ideology -  but no negative attitudes, or vice versa. Often, though, they occur together -  people often
18 Jones, W, 'Philosophy and the Ethical Significance of Spectatorship: An Introduction to Ethics at the Cinema' 
in Jones and Vice, (Ed.) Ethics at the Cinema, p. 4
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have sexually prejudiced ideologies, as well as negative attitudes towards LGBTIAQ people. There are 
thus three types of sexual prejudice, depending on which of the components are present: ideology- 
based sexual prejudice, attitude-based sexual prejudice, and mixed sexual prejudice.
These two components have been explored, both with regard to sexism, and with regard to 
racism. The literature on racism is, I think, particularly useful for thinking about sexual prejudice.
J.L.A. Garcia, in 'The Heart of Racism' argues for the view that racism should be seen primarily 
as a matter of bad attitudes towards people or groups based on their racial classification. He sees 
racism as "...fundamentally a vicious kind of racially based disregard for the welfare of certain 
people."19 Racism, on this view, can be a matter of hatred -  of active disaffection. It can also be less 
extreme in that it can be a matter of not caring, nor caring enough, or caring in the wrong ways for 
the welfare of others based on their racial classification. This is morally wrong in two ways. Firstly, it 
is non-benevolent -  it involves failing to care for people as one should (or actively wishing harm on 
them, in more extreme cases). It is also unjust -  it involves not according people the respect they 
deserve as people. Beliefs, on Garcia's view, are not the core of racism -  attitudes are.
Tommie Shelby in 'Is Racism in the "Heart"?' -  his response to Garcia -  pays more attention 
to the link between beliefs and attitude, but still does not focus on the relationship as such. He argues 
that, while attitudes might often be involved in cases of racism, it is ideologies -  "widely accepted 
illusory systems of belief that function to establish or reinforce structures of social oppression,"20 -  
which are the essential factor which decides whether something is an instance of racism or not. Shelby 
argues that we cannot have access to whether or not a negative attitude on the part of Person A 
towards Person B is actually a result of the other's race and not another feature without ascribing at 
least one negative belief to Person A. Unless we know something of Person A's beliefs, we cannot be 
sure that it is racism and not simply a dislike of Person B for individual reasons that constitutes Person 
A's attitude towards Person B. As Shelby puts it
If all we know, say, is that Stephen (a white person) dislikes Andre (a black 
person), then we don't yet know whether Stephen's dislike for Andre is racist. To settle 
that, we also need to know why he dislikes him. If it is simply because Andre is having a 
love affair with the woman Stephen loves (who, let us say, happens to be white), then 
this is not racist, provided Andre's "race" is not an aggravating factor. In order for his 
dislike to be racist, it would have to be based at least in part on the fact that Andre is a 
member of the "black race," where Andre's "blackness" (at least partially) grounds 
Stephen's dislike. Thus, if Stephen's dislike of Andre is racist, this has to be (at least in
19 Garcia, 'The Heart of Racism', p. 259
20 Shelby, 'Is Racism in the Heart?', p. 415
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part) because of Stephen's beliefs about the racial characteristics of black people and the 
role that these beliefs play in his motivation, speech, and conduct.21 
It is Person A's beliefs, rather than her attitudes, which decide whether she is racist or not.
I think that in the case of sexual prejudice, neither Garcia nor Shelby is entirely wrong. Shelby's 
criticism of Garcia, their essential disagreement, is about whether it is attitudes or beliefs that form 
the essence of prejudice. Based on both a common-sense understanding of sexual prejudice, and on 
the literature, however, it seems clear that both attitudes and beliefs -  ideologies -  can qualify as 
sexual prejudice. Furthermore, they can each exist without the other to at least some extent.
I do think that in cases of prejudice which are primarily attitude-based, the person must at 
least have one or two basic beliefs. Shelby argues that we cannot make sense of a negative attitude 
being prejudiced unless we can attribute some kind of negative belief to the person with the attitude. 
I think Shelby might be right about this in the sense that saying someone has a prejudiced attitude 
might necessitate saying they at least believe that the person they have a negative attitude towards 
is a member of the group in question. For Person A's negative attitude towards Person B to count as 
sexual prejudice, Person A has to believe that Person B is homosexual, and have the negative attitude 
be associated with that belief. The attitudes are, however, still the central factor here. I think in the 
case of people who respond with disgust to homosexuality, this might sometimes be the case. 
Someone might believe that Person B is homosexual and be disgusted by the idea, without any real 
beliefs about homosexuality being wrong. There is a belief in this case, but the belief is not in itself 
prejudicial -  it is the attitude component that makes it prejudicial. This is still prejudice, because it is 
a negative response to someone based on their membership within a certain group.
Sexually prejudicial attitudes, then, can exist without any substantial negative beliefs about 
homosexuality. I think that negative ideologies can also exist without attitudes we would normally 
label prejudicial. There may be attitudes attached to these beliefs, but they may not necessarily be 
ones we traditionally associate with sexual prejudice. One could believe that homosexuality is 
immoral, and that all gay people are going to hell for it, and feel pity rather than hatred, for example. 
I think this would still be regarded as prejudice because of the condemnatory nature of the belief that 
homosexuality is immoral, or that it is worthy of hell. Prejudicial beliefs seem to be able to exist 
without prejudicial attitudes, and vice versa.
21 Shelby, 'Is Racism in the Heart?', p. 414
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i. Gender Identity-threat: A Third Component?
Interestingly, heterosexual men are more likely than heterosexual women to be sexually prejudiced. 
They are also more likely to be prejudiced against gay or bisexual men than lesbian or bisexual 
women.22 Falomir-Pichastor and Mugny suggest that one reason that this might be the case is that 
men's gender esteem is tied up in their difference from homosexual men, and it is particularly when 
they feel that their identity as heterosexual men, and the related esteem, is threatened, that sexual 
prejudice rears its head. So
[W]hen bogus feedback to heterosexual men portrayed them as scoring lower than the 
average on a masculinity scale, they behaved more aggressively against a homosexual 
partner, as compared to a heterosexual partner, during an interactive learning task...
These findings...suggest that sexual prejudice may accomplish the defensive function of 
maintaining a positive and distinctive gender identity.: Men would be more rejecting of 
homosexuals in order to fulfill their need to affirm their masculinity by distancing 
themselves from those with whom they do not want to be confused. Indeed, sexual 
prejudice is related to a greater perceived dissimilarity between the self and 
homosexuals, a pattern observed specifically for heterosexual men... Considering 
psychological distancing as a consequence of perceived threat to identity .overall these 
findings provide support for the hypothesis that heterosexual men's sexual prejudice is 
related to a threat to their gender identity.23
According to social identity theory, our identities are partially constituted of the in-groups we 
belong to -  "group members derive their self-esteem from their group membership and are motivated 
to achieve a positive and distinctive social identity by comparing their ingroup to relevant 
outgroups."24 It seems, then, that expressions of sexual prejudice can be a way for heterosexual men 
in particular to illustrate their difference from homosexual men, by enacting gender roles traditionally 
associated with masculinity.
Falomir-Pichastor and Mugny argue that men are more expected than women to conform to 
gender norms. This is problematic, but enlightening. The gender norms men are expected to conform 
to involve violence and aggression, being "strong" while women's involve care. Trying to act out or
22 Falomir-Pichastor and Mugny, '"I'm not gay...I'm a real man!": Heterosexual Men's Gender Self-Esteem and 
Sexual Prejudice' and Ratcliff, Lassiter, Markman and Snyder, 'Gender Differences in Attitudes Towards Gay 
men and Lesbians: The Role of Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice.'
23 Falomir-Pichastor and Mugny, '"I'm not gay...I'm a real man!": Heterosexual Men's Gender Self-Esteem and 
Sexual Prejudice', p. 2
24 24 Falomir-Pichastor and Mugny, '"I'm not gay...I'm a real man!": Heterosexual Men's Gender Self-Esteem 
and Sexual Prejudice', p. 2
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emphasise the former more visibly is obviously more likely to lead to violence than trying to act out 
or emphasise the latter.
The question of exactly how responding in a non-sexually prejudiced way to homosexuality 
would threaten the gender esteem or gender identity of heterosexual men at all is made clearer if one 
considers what Kroeper, Sanchez and Himmelstein label precarious manhood. This view holds that 
manhood is something that has to be earned, enacted, and reinforced, it is not something which one 
automatically possesses by being an adult male. If one holds such a view, it is relatively easy to see 
how being positive towards homosexuals -  who are stereotyped as being effeminate, though this is 
often not the case -  might be seen as failing to enact, and thus possess, one's masculine identity.25 
According to Kroeper, Sanchez and Himmelstein, the tendency to re-affirm one's own gender-identity 
by expressions of stereotypically masculine behaviour is much more pronounced in heterosexual men 
who endorse precarious manhood.
One might think that the identity-threat view of homosexuality comprises another component 
of sexual prejudice altogether. I think, however, that the identity-threat view of sexual prejudice is 
rather one possible way that someone might be motivated to form and/or express negative ideologies 
and/or attitudes about members of the LGBTIAQ community. So one develops negative beliefs and/or 
attitudes as a way of protecting one's gender identity and gender esteem. The identity-threat is thus 
not a component of sexual prejudice, but a motivation to develop it.
One possibility, which Kroeper, Sanchez and Himmelstein suggest, is that the identity-threat 
posed by expressing positive or even neutral attitudes towards homosexuality might cause people 
who are not themselves sexually prejudiced (in the sense of having negative beliefs or attitudes about 
the LGBTIAQ community) to express sexual prejudice to ensure that those around them do not see 
them as being less masculine. I am not sure whether this counts as sexual prejudice or not. I am rather 
inclined to think not. In addition, given that this kind of expression of prejudice is going to be 
dependent on people around one being sexually prejudiced, and that my ultimate aim is to do with 
targeting sexual prejudice that is in some way resistant to argument, I do not think that expressed but 
not held sexual prejudice is really going to be relevant to my thesis. 26
25 Kroeper, Sanchez and Himmelstein, 'Heterosexual Men's Confrontation of Sexual Prejudice: The Role of 
Precarious Manhood', p. 2
26 I am looking at this as a motivation for developing sexual prejudice. It has implications for why we might be 
motivated to hold steady sexual prejudice, but I will not discuss this in the chapter on motivation. It is a 
complex subject, and I do not have the space to do it justice.
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What's the point?
It seems to me that there are two elements of sexual prejudice, which sometimes occur together and 
sometimes apart. There is the more belief-based kind of sexual prejudice, where people have factual 
and/or normative beliefs about the status of homosexuality and homosexual people. There is also a 
kind of sexual prejudice is more to do with attitudes than beliefs. This might take the form of hatred, 
or disgust. There might also be beliefs involved in this kind of sexual prejudice in the sense that in 
order to justify hatred one might need to have rationalising beliefs about homosexual people, but the 
attitudes are the driving force behind the sexual prejudice in this case. I think often there are going to 
be both attitudes and beliefs involved in sexual prejudice, but each is sufficient for sexual prejudice on 
its own. I have argued that neither is necessarily prior in the sense that something would not count as 
an instance of prejudice were it not to involve that particular component. In this thesis, I am primarily 
interested in the kind of sexual prejudice which involves both attitudes and beliefs. Having discussed 
in more detail what I think might be entailed in sexual prejudice, I will move on to talking about the 
kind of motivations that we might have for the phenomena, using sexual prejudice as an example. 
Again, when I speak of motivations, I do not mean conscious ones. We do not, I think, consciously 
choose to engage in the phenomena. Nor, more subtly, do we choose to prefer one belief over another 
for non-evidential reasons. Rather, there are factors which affect us unconsciously. I have called them 
motivations because they are factors which play a motivating role when it comes to the functioning of 
our beliefs. I speak about motivations as though there are choices being made, because in a sense 
there are -  but they are not conscious. I speak later about why I think that they cannot be so.
2.2. What kind of causal story could we tell?
The phenomena described above can be seen clearly in the experiments that have been done. How 
they come about, however, is more mysterious. It seems to me that Quine's picture of beliefs is very 
useful here. The claim that Quine makes which is most relevant to the phenomena I have tried to 
isolate -  his main lesson, if you will -  is the claim that our beliefs form a web, which we try to avoid 
re-arranging as much as possible. This claim gives us the start of an explanation of why we might be 
motivated to engage in the phenomena described above. I will argue, however, that Quine's picture 
only goes part of the way to explaining what is happening in situations such as the one Person A and 
Person B find themselves in.
Quine develops an account of human belief that sees our beliefs as a web, which is only partly 
based on experience. So "[t]he totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs...is a man-made fabric
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which impinges on experience only along the edges."27 On this view, beliefs near the centre of that 
web are more strongly held and difficult to give up on (for example beliefs that were previously thought 
of as analytic beliefs, and may now be thought of as a priori beliefs, such as 2+2=4)28. Beliefs that are 
nearer the edges, on the other hand, are less strongly held and easier to give up on. Observational 
beliefs such as "it is raining outside" would be peripheral in this way -  if I look outside and it is not 
raining, I will change my belief that it is. Importantly, the beliefs in the web are all interconnected. Our 
beliefs cannot be completely isolated from each other. As a very basic example, my beliefs about how 
healthy certain foods are have an impact on my beliefs about what I ought to eat regularly.
This view of belief allows for certain statements to be held true no matter what, provided that 
one makes adjustments to the rest of the web. Similarly, each statement can be open to change. So it 
is possible to hold statements near the perimeter of the web steady in the face of contradictory 
evidence. I could, for example say that the evidence was hallucinated. It is also possible to change 
beliefs near the centre (for example giving up on the universality of Newtonian physics).29 This would 
only happen in special circumstances, however. Generally, what it means to say that a belief is in the 
centre of the web is that we are less likely to give that belief up in the face of contradictory 
observational evidence. So if I put two pairs of socks in the washing machine, and only three come 
back out, I am likely to try and re-arrange my observational beliefs and not my mathematical belief 
that 2+2=4. This is not always the case, however. Sometimes we will stick with observation over 
previous beliefs. This might be the case when the beliefs are not very central, or when we have to give 
up on central beliefs because there are simply too many observational inconsistencies that cannot be 
explained or dismissed without giving up on those beliefs.
In addition to avoiding making re-arrangements to our central beliefs, we tend (and this is 
what I am referring to as Quine's main lesson) to try and avoid re-arranging our beliefs as much as 
possible. The interconnectedness of beliefs means, after all, that giving up on one belief inevitably will 
have repercussions for other beliefs, though to varying extents. One might wonder why we should 
actually believe that we do this. I think that there are examples that show this to be the case. When 
we think about why we more easily give up on some beliefs than others, the answer does seem to 
have to do with how much giving up that belief would impact the rest of our belief systems. Giving up 
on the belief that 2+2=4 would have drastic consequences for the rest of my belief system. My 
understanding of the number system -  something that affects a great many of our beliefs (think of 
our whole economic system, for example) -  would have to change. It is easier to give up on the belief
27 Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', p. 39
28 This paper is to do with the analytic/synthetic distinction, but Quine's picture of belief has a rather wider 
application. Beliefs near the center would not necessarily have to be analytic.
29 Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', p. 40
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that I put two full pairs of socks in the washing machine (a belief which affects very few other beliefs 
in any significant way) than give up on 2+2=4. Intuitively, the best explanation for the tendency to give 
up on some beliefs rather than others is related to how much those beliefs would affect the rest of 
my beliefs.
This view of belief is taken from Quine. I think that he is roughly right about these elements. I 
may, however, draw different conclusions from Quine, or nuance the view in a way that he would not 
approve of. If that is the case, then I am happy to say that I am using a Quinean picture of belief, rather 
than Quine's picture of belief. What I have just described is, however, the core of his view, and I think 
it is largely right.
One of the things we could say about Person A and Person B above is that they have beliefs 
which are central. The belief "homosexuality is wrong" is connected to many other beliefs, and can 
also affect how we engage with other beliefs. This overarching belief is tied to beliefs about gay 
marriage, about who should be allowed to adopt children, about the ethical climate of one's country, 
about how to treat certain people. It also has implications for how we judge other beliefs. So the new 
belief "Mark has started dating Jake" might have different evaluative judgements attached to it, 
depending on whether the person holding that new belief believes that homosexuality is wrong or 
not. Of course, the fact that this overarching belief behaves in this way does not necessarily mean that 
everyone who believes that homosexuality is wrong will treat LGBTIAQ people badly. Nonetheless, 
there are likely to be implications for behaviour, even if they are relatively positive. Someone might 
pray for their LGBTIAQ friends, or try to persuade them to go to church. They may treat them with 
sympathy rather than anger or disgust. The beliefs about what behaviour is necessary or appropriate 
are still linked in with the view that homosexuality is something problematic. It is this 
interconnectedness, and the ability to affect other beliefs, that makes this belief central.
Quine never specifically talks about evaluative beliefs. His web of belief is set up to account 
for the perceived difference between scientific beliefs and beliefs traditionally thought of as analytic 
-  mathematical beliefs, for example. One might wonder whether evaluative beliefs, such as those 
about homosexuality, belong in Quine's web at all. It seems rather strange to me, though, to leave 
evaluative beliefs out of the web. It makes little sense to come up with an account of scientific belief 
that does not connect with normative beliefs. It seems very unlikely that half of our beliefs would be 
interconnected with each other, but not with the other half. Furthermore, beliefs Quine does include 
in the belief web -  truths that are traditionally seen as analytic -  are not necessarily scientific. Maths 
is included, yes, but logical truths -  like the principle of non-contradiction -  would be too, and it is not 
clear that these are scientific.
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It is clear that normative beliefs and factual beliefs are interconnected in the way Quine 
describes. Studies that show that gay couples raise healthy children -  a factual claim -  have direct 
bearing on whether or not homosexuality is ethically problematic. Of course, this would not be 
relevant to all sexually prejudiced beliefs, but I think it will be true of enough to be something to 
consider. If gay couples do raise healthy children, the normative claim that homosexuality is wrong is 
undercut. It would be problematic to keep believing that homosexuality is wrong because it causes 
harm to children in the face of contradictory evidence. The evidential claims made about actual same- 
sex parent families and normative claims about the ethical status of homosexuality with regard to its 
effect on children are linked. This is again simply one example of a factual belief that has an impact on 
views the sexually prejudiced person might have. Not every sexually prejudiced person's beliefs are 
going to take this form, but I think it is often going to be the case that some factual questions are going 
to be related to people's beliefs about homosexuality -  whether those factual beliefs are about the 
parenting skills of LGBTIAQ people or not. In the argument between Person A and Person B above, 
each has beliefs about matters of fact -  gay couples are, or are not, more likely to be unhappy, other 
animals show homosexuality etc. -  and these beliefs are tied in with normative claims about 
homosexuality.
Though I have argued that normative beliefs are connected to factual ones, I still need to 
explain how they connect to experience. Some of the beliefs within Quine's web are more closely 
related to experience and observation than others. The central beliefs, which are further away from 
experience, are still connected, though at various distances, to the beliefs at the periphery. It seems 
to me that evaluative beliefs are often of this kind. They are usually connected to matters of fact in 
some way, as I have just argued, but observation does not generally cause us to give up on them. 
Nonetheless, enough evidence that, say, homosexuality is not harmful, but sexual prejudice is, might 
eventually cause someone to give up on that evaluative belief. Similarly, I will argue later in this 
chapter that enough evidence can eventually cause us to give up on, or at least nuance, other central 
beliefs, even mathematical ones. It is far more difficult, however, for evidence to cause us to give up 
on more central beliefs -  like mathematical ones or evaluative ones -  than is the case for peripheral 
beliefs. Evaluative beliefs are not as central as mathematical ones, but it makes sense to fit them into 
a fairly central place on the belief-web.
Quine's own view, while dealing with scientific beliefs, gives us some reason to think that it 
would at least not be incompatible with his view to think that normative beliefs must be part of the 
same web as scientific ones. On Quine's account, the analytic/synthetic distinction falls away, as does 
the a priori/a posteriori one. He argues -  I think successfully -  in his paper 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' 
that there is no difference in kind between analytic truths such as mathematical truths and synthetic
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truths based on observation.30 Any belief can, on this account, "face the tribunal of observation."31 
While he is still talking mostly about mathematical/logical and scientific beliefs, his distrust of the idea 
that beliefs are of different kinds suggests at the very least that the picture is open to beliefs being 
part of the same web, even if we would normally see them as being different in kind.
A combination of the strangeness of having a web of belief that excludes some beliefs, the 
links between evaluative and factual beliefs, and Quine's own distrust of separating out different kinds 
of beliefs, inclines me to think that evaluative beliefs ought to be part of the web. Quine did not intend 
this, as far as I can tell, but these factors seem to me to outweigh this fact. I am not wedded to Quine's 
entire view. I am using the central part of his picture of belief, but I am setting up a Quinean picture, 
rather than directly applying Quine's view, as is, to the phenomena I am trying to explain.
It seems, then, that Quine's view of belief can be applied to at least some cases of sexual 
prejudice. His account is not uncontroversial, however. There are several possible objections which 
one might consider against this view. One might argue that the reason that we do not give up on the 
belief that 2+2=4 in response to evidence is not that it is central, but that it is a priori. The set of beliefs 
that Quine calls central -  the ones that are the most central, on his view -  are usually ones which are 
traditionally seen as analytic, and/or a priori. If mathematical knowledge is a priori, after all, then we 
cannot expect evidence to have any effect on it, because the knowledge is outside the domain of 
evidence. I know that 2+2=4 in such a way that no experience could change it. I think, however, that 
the development of Non-Euclidean geometry suggests that this is false.
Any mathematical system has to be built on a set of assumptions. Euclid was the first to fully 
recognise and make use of this. He developed twenty-three definitions of concepts such as lines and 
points, as well as the basic assumptions on which our everyday, high-school geometry is based. 
Euclid's five principles seem to me to be a priori truths, as are his definitions and postulates. 
Something like "[p]arallel straight lines are straight lines which, being in the same plane and being 
produced indefinitely in both directions, do not meet one another in either direction,"32 or "[t]hings 
which are equal to the same thing are also equal to each other"33 seem to me to be paradigmatic 
instances of what are generally seen as a priori truths. As it turns out, however, we34 can set up a 
geometry that has different definitions and starting assumptions, and still does not lead to 
contradictions later on. There are two different kinds of Non-Euclidean geometry -  spherical and
30 Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'.
31 Quine and Ullian, 'The Web of Belief', p. 13
32 Wolfe, Introduction to Non-Euclidean Geometry, p.3
33 Wolfe, Introduction to Non-Euclidean Geometry, p.4
34 Well, probably not me. But people who are far better at Maths than I am can and have.
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hyperbolic.35 Spherical geometry works -  as the name would suggest -  on the surface of a sphere. 
Hyperbolic geometry works in curved space.
The ability to set up an alternate geometry that does not lead to contradictions is impressive 
enough, but non-Euclidean geometries also have another point in their favour. Despite the a priori 
nature of mathematical truth, one of its features is that it describes the world. This is part of why it 
helps us make sense of physics, and fly rocket ships to the moon. It is a way of describing relationships 
in the world. Euclidean geometry describes the world as it functions on the level of macro-experience 
-  the level explained by the Newtonian world picture. It describes the space we encounter in everyday 
life. Hyperbolic geometry, however, is used in work on special relativity, and spherical geometry is 
used, for example, to describe the Earth. Both kinds of non-Euclidean geometry better describe the 
way the world works under different circumstances.36
The point of this example is to argue that it is in principle possible even for mathematical 
beliefs to be refined. Arguing that some beliefs do not change because they are a priori -  a different 
kind of belief -  would not be enough to challenge Quine's picture of centrality as being the important 
feature in a case where we do not give up a belief in response to observational evidence. The objection 
that these beliefs are a priori does not hold. Non-Euclidean geometry does not overwrite Euclidean 
geometry, but it does cause us to make changes to our basic beliefs about geometry. This suggests 
that it is possible to change even mathematical beliefs under the right circumstances, which lends at 
least some support to Quine's picture that there is no real difference between a priori and a posteriori 
(or analytic and synthetic) beliefs.
In his paper, 'Two Dogmas Revisited', Quine claims that we choose not to revoke 
mathematical claims not because they are analytic, but because "such a move would reverberate 
excessively through the rest of science."37 This leaves room for a picture of belief and belief webs that 
suggests that how close a belief is to the centre of the belief web is simply a matter of how strongly it 
ties in with other beliefs, and how many other beliefs it ties in to. As we build up pictures of the world, 
we begin to see connections between beliefs, we begin to form unconscious associations between 
beliefs. We both consciously and unconsciously try to tie our beliefs together into a coherent whole -  
and so we form a belief web.38
35 Krioukov, Papadopoulos, Kitsak, Vahdat, and Boguna, 'Hyperbolic Geometry of Complex Networks', p. 2
36 Wolfe, Introduction to Non-Euclidean Geometry, Krioukov et al, 'Hyperbolic Geometry of Complex 
Networks'.
37 Quine, 'Two Dogmas Revisited, p. 270
38 Something that it is worthwhile to consider is that people sometimes have contradictions within their belief- 
webs. I think it must be the case that we cannot consciously do this. There is a school of philosophers who 
believe that we ought to embrace contradictions, but I do not have the space to engage with this here. I am 
going to take it as fairly uncontroversial that we cannot consciously and rationally believe contradictions. The 
beliefs in our belief webs are connected by what we take to be logical and/or evidential links. We cannot
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There may be concern that Quine's picture of belief does not allow for change -  that if Quine 
is right our central beliefs actually cannot change. This does not follow from Quine's view. I take it that 
the core of Quine's picture is that our beliefs are interconnected, that these connections mean that 
changing one belief might entail changing others, and that we can hold beliefs steady or change them 
by manipulating the rest of our belief-web. This does not mean that we cannot change beliefs -  in 
fact, he explicitly states that we can -  and it does not yet say anything about when we ought to hold 
beliefs steady, and when we ought to change them. Quine allows for changes to be made to belief 
webs in response to evidence, but I also think he allows the possibility that we can change beliefs in 
response to argument. Argument can, and often does, include evidence, but it can also take the form 
of setting a position out in such a way that its contradictions become apparent. If I argue that the view 
that one ought to love thy neighbour is inconsistent with the view that we should deny LGBTIAQ 
people rights based on their sexual orientation and/or gender identity, I am trying to change 
someone's mind with argument, not necessarily with factual evidence.39 The person who is persuaded 
by a teacher or friend that karate is a better sport for them than tennis because it requires less 
equipment, is not dependent on the weather, and gives them self-defence skills as well as fitness has 
formed or changed a belief in response to argument -  and there is nothing in Quine that does not 
allow for this. As a matter of fact we sometimes do not change our beliefs in response to evidence or 
argument, and Quine describes this fact -  but that is a property of us, which Quine's picture explains, 
not a fault in Quine's picture. If I am giving Quine too much credit, then I am happy to accept that this 
is one of the points at which Quine's view and mine diverge.
2.3. Quine and the phenomena.
Quine makes some sort of sense of idee fixe. If a belief is central, then we are likely to re-arrange or 
reject other, more peripheral, beliefs rather than the centrally held belief. So, for example, the sexually 
prejudiced person might be motivated to hold on to the belief that gay people are harmful to children
consciously have links between beliefs that flout the laws of logic. What we might be able to do, however, is 
come up with a rationalising story that masks the contradiction to us -  i.e., we can form another belief in order 
to make the two beliefs compatible. It is possible, I would imagine, to have two beliefs that seem incompatible 
or contradictory on the surface, but actually are not. Nonetheless, I think it is also possible to come up with 
beliefs that make incompatible or contradictory beliefs seem compatible. I take it that it not just something 
about our psychology that makes us unable to hold contradictory beliefs consciously. There is something in 
fact problematic about that -  namely that if two beliefs are genuinely contradictory, they cannot both be right. 
I am interested, however, in what happens when we do hold contradictory beliefs, and manage to cover up 
that fact to ourselves.
39 It may be a fact that the argument is good, or a fact that love and the denial of rights is inconsistent, but that 
is different to saying that the argument is based on factual evidence. It is based on logical relations between 
beliefs, which can, but need not, include factual ones.
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they raise, even in the face of counter-evidence or counter-argument. Giving up on that belief would 
have implications for other beliefs. It might have an impact on beliefs about gay marriage, for example, 
or about the moral permissibility of homosexuality in general. The belief that gay parents are bad for 
the children they raise would presumably count as evidence that homosexuality is wrong. If this belief 
is given up on, it seems that it should at least cause the believer to question the overarching belief 
again. Avoiding giving up on this belief, then, means that the person would not have to re-arrange or 
re-open the question of other beliefs that are linked to the first one. While the sexually prejudiced 
person might be aware of the fact that she does not want to give up on the belief, she is likely to still 
believe that she has good epistemic reason to hold on to the belief -  she cannot consciously think that 
she is only holding onto it because she wants to. As a result of this kind of motivating concern, we re­
arrange evidence that contradicts central beliefs, rather than giving up on or re-arranging the beliefs 
themselves. We are thus motivated to engage in this phenomenon, because holding beliefs that we 
already have steady means that we will avoid having to make changes elsewhere in the web. This 
account seems to suggest that mathematical beliefs are also subject to idee fixe. After all, they remain 
steady in the face of counter-evidence as well. I think that this does not necessarily follow. Saying that 
the centrality of beliefs is part of what might cause a problematic phenomenon does not necessarily 
entail that all central beliefs are necessarily prone to that phenomenon. In the next two chapters of 
this thesis, I will touch on what I think the differences between beliefs such as 2+2=4 and sexually 
prejudiced beliefs are, despite the fact that they both have a tendency to remain steady.
Quine's structure also goes some way to making sense of phenomenon 6 -  being hyper-critical 
of disconfirming evidence. Firstly, if we are motivated to engage in idee fixe, and hyper-criticality is 
one way of going about idee fixe, then we have some reason to engage in hyper-criticality. I think 
Quine's picture can explain more than this, though. Simply put, I think the set of beliefs that we already 
have is going to have an impact on whether we see a particular piece of evidence as good or not. As 
Lord, Ross and Lepper point out, we do not approach inquiry from a blank-slate kind of position. The 
web of beliefs we already have is going to be the starting point of any inquiry. What we strongly believe 
to be true is going to affect what else we can accept -  and this may well lead us to interpret evidence 
in such a way that we are not confronted with effective challenges to our central beliefs. In fact, the 
way this picture is built up is going to have an impact on what we take to be evidence at all. So we are 
going to tend to be more critical of disconfirming evidence than confirming evidence, because the 
belief we hold at the start of the inquiry is linked to other beliefs, which influence how we read and 
interpret evidence. I, for example believe that homosexuality is perfectly fine, and that belief ties in 
strongly with other ethical beliefs, as well as factual beliefs. It ties in with the belief that it is wrong to 
hate people, blaming people for something that is not their choice is wrong, discrimination is bad, gay
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people do not raise unhappy children, it is not inherently more likely that gay couples will be unfaithful 
to each other etc. Those beliefs lead me to interpret evidence in a certain way. So if someone presents 
a study to me that claims to show that a greater number of children raised by gay couples experience 
social anxiety later in life, I am likely to resist it in any way I can. I will not want to accept it because 
that would challenge beliefs which might have quite severe repercussions for my web if I were to 
change it, given that the belief is knotted in with so many others. I want to avoid this kind of change, 
and it is easier to give up on the belief that the evidence is good than to give up on my centrally held 
belief. Again, I must believe that I am holding onto the belief for good reason. Nonetheless, the desire 
is affecting my response to the evidence.
2.4. What does Quine fail to make sense of?
2.3.1 Phenomenon 7: Polarisation
Quine's account of belief is useful for explaining the motivation we might have for engaging in 
phenomena 5 and 6. Phenomenon 7 (polarisation), however, is harder for him to account for. Quine's 
account gives us reason to engage in the other phenomena to at least some extent. Just wanting to 
hold certain beliefs steady, however, does not explain why we might engage in a process which leads 
us to hold them more strongly after a debate than we did going in. We have reason, on Quine's 
account, to have the same beliefs coming out as we did going in, but not to hold them even more 
strongly.
In fact, this phenomenon is difficult to explain in any kind of rational way. I am guessing that 
this is actually a fairly irrational reaction. It does seem, though, that it might be partly a result of a 
particular way of seeing arguments and debates -  their purposes and their structure. What seems to 
be going on here is that we are perceiving the evidence against our position as weak (due to hyper­
criticality), and seeing this as support for our own position rather than simply a lack of support for an 
opposing one. To be sure, if all the evidence for an opposing position is weak, it is an indication that 
one's own position is more likely to be a good one -  but it is not positive evidence for one's position. 
It should not make one hold one's own position more strongly, though if one is right that the evidence 
for the opposing position is weak, it should make one more reluctant to hold the opposing belief. As 
it happens, however, because I perceive the evidence against my position as bad, the connections 
between my evidence and my beliefs get stronger, and the two start backing each other up to an even 
greater extent. This is not going to be a rational move. It rather strikes me as a kind of fallacy.
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2.3.2. The Battlefield View of Argument
I would suggest that the whole way we tend to approach arguments in the sphere of ethics, norms, 
and social discussions is problematic from the beginning. We tend to see arguments as a kind of battle. 
My argument makes up my army, your argument makes up yours. We sally forth, waving reason like 
a broadsword and do our best to beat the other person around the head with it. This seems decidedly 
counterproductive.
To take this attitude towards debate seems to involve seeing the other person as an opponent. 
It takes the starting point (though to greater or lesser extents depending on the person and argument) 
that I am right, and the other person wrong. Furthermore, if I lose the argument, and it proves to be 
the other way around, I have failed in some way. This might not always be important to us, but in the 
cases I am interested in -  cases of ethics -  it usually is. It matters to us that we are right about ethics 
-  and if we see argument as a battleground, it becomes a battle for who has the best ethical views. 
This already gives us reason to try as hard as we can to win, because we want to believe that we are 
ethical -  and thus that we have good ethical views. As we become more focused on winning the 
argument (bearing in mind that we do think we are right), we start to lose track of any co-operative 
nature that argument might be able to have.
It seems to me that seeing debate and argument as a battleground is unproductive. There 
should be something co-operative about argument, particularly in the realm of ethics. When we are 
arguing about ethics, we are not just trying to prove each other wrong -  or at least we should not be. 
We are trying to find better ways of living together, and coping with the world, particularly the social 
world. We are trying to get the world right, whether in an ethical sense, or in the sense of having true 
beliefs about the world or both.
The battlefield analogy goes some way to explaining the phenomenon of polarisation. It is 
partly irrational, but the urge to hold onto one's original position is heightened by the tendency to 
think that if we change our minds, if our own views prove wrong or less helpful than our "opponents'", 
then we have lost. Changing our minds becomes a defeat -  a sign that we were wrong, which instead 
of just involving the admission that our previous way of looking at the world was not the best way, 
also reflects on our abilities somehow. Seeing argument as a battlefield also seems to underlie 
phenomenon 6 (hyper-criticality) to some extent. That we want to win the argument makes us more 
likely to engage critically with disconfirming but not confirming evidence.
Given that polarisation seems to be working in a slightly different way to hyper-criticality and 
idee fixe, my focus will shift slightly in the rest of this thesis. I will be talking slightly more about the 
first two phenomena. I will, however, still refer to polarisation, rather than cutting it out as I did with 
Wason's phenomena, as the picture I will set out is still largely relevant to it.
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2.5. Is there anything left over?
I argued that our beliefs form a Quinean belief web. Some of these beliefs, by virtue of being 
connected to others, are central, and hard to give up on. The more interconnected a belief is -  the 
more beliefs it is connected to, and the stronger those connections are -  the more central it is. The 
centrality of a belief gives us one motivation for holding that belief steady. Giving up on a central belief 
would involve re-arranging our belief webs, and probably giving up on other beliefs, and we do not 
want to do this. I think, though, that Quine's picture still does not fully capture what is happening 
when we are engaging in idee fixe and hyper-criticality. Centrality is to do with the evidential links 
between beliefs, links of reason. Beliefs do not, however, only affect other beliefs, nor are they only 
affected by other beliefs. We would like to believe that our beliefs are affected only by evidence, that 
they are truth directed, but there are other factors which influence what we believe. The person who 
refuses to believe that their spouse is having an affair, for example, is having their beliefs be affected 
by their desires. I think it would be a mistake in a case like this to think that it is just the fact that the 
belief "my spouse is faithful" is connected to other beliefs that makes the believer here unwilling to 
give up on the belief. I think it is unlikely that this is a conscious process -  we cannot consciously 
choose to believe for non-evidential reasons. Nonetheless, I think it is likely that the importance of 
certain beliefs to us can affect how strongly we hold them, and whether we are likely to engage in 
strategies such as hyper-criticality to maintain them in the face of counter-evidence. It is this influence, 
the role of non-evidential factors, which Quine fails to capture.
In the Lord, Ross and Lepper experiment, for example, it matters that the belief was an ethical 
one. It matters that the topic was capital punishment -  something the participants felt strongly about. 
In the following section, I will try and tease out what the character of the "feeling strongly" might be, 
and what role it might play in causing us to hold some beliefs steady.
I think that there are three different factors that influence the importance of a belief.40 The 
first is that there are emotional or affective aspects playing a role in holding that belief steady. The 
second is that the agent has certain attitudes which are impacting on the belief. Finally, the values of 
the agent are playing a role. These three possible influences are connected, in the sense that 
emotions, attitudes, and values influence each other, but that does not necessarily mean that they all 
affect beliefs in the same way. There may also be multiple ways in which each of these factors 
influence beliefs. I will use the term 'importance' to refer to the effect of these kind of factors. This 
does not necessarily simply mean that it is important to us to hold the beliefs, though it can mean this.
40 There may be others as well. I am not worried by this possibility. I am simply focusing on these.
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Rather, I will describe a belief as important as a shorthand for when it is being affected by emotions, 
attitudes and/or values.
2.4.1. Emotions
It seems to me that there is a case to be made for the view that emotions have an impact on beliefs. 
Emotion has been understood in different ways, and one of the differences is just how cognitive 
emotions actually are. There are various plausible accounts which suggest that emotion does have at 
least some role to play in how we form and hold beliefs.
Alison Jaggar41 sets out a picture of belief which takes the interplay between the emotional 
and the cognitive seriously. She argues that the distinction between the rational and the emotional is 
artificial. Beliefs and emotions are involved in a dialectical relationship. Emotions, she argues, must be 
in some sense dependent on beliefs. She points out that the same physiological feeling can be 
interpreted differently based on the situation. The feeling produced by adrenaline, for example, might 
be interpreted as fear or excitement depending on the context, and one's beliefs about what emotions 
are appropriate in which contexts. This is, according to Jaggar, likely to be partially socially 
constructed, because of the importance of having concepts which are given meaning by our cultures. 
Someone born in a culture without the concept of fidelity, for example, would not feel betrayal at 
infidelity.
So beliefs underlie emotions in that they give meaning to the meaningful aspects of emotion. 
They give form to emotion, prescribe what emotion is appropriate when, and enable us to understand 
complex emotions.
Beliefs thus underlie emotions, but emotions also underlie beliefs. Belief formation based on 
observation, for example, is affected by emotion. We select and interpret information about the world 
around us, and both the selection and interpretation are affected by emotion.
Ronald de Sousa makes a similar point, but focuses more on the impact emotions can have on 
belief. In his discussion of emotion he suggests that human emotions affect decisions by "orienting 
attention toward this or that among the plethora of considerations that might be thought relevant at 
any particular juncture."42 So emotions pick out what is important enough to take into consideration 
when forming beliefs about the world through observation.
Jaggar goes slightly further than de Sousa, however. On her picture, concepts and emotions 
are closely related. Having the concept "fidelity" is what enables me to be angry or hurt at infidelity.
41 Jaggar, 'Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology'.
42 De Sousa, 'Emotions: What I know, What I'd like to Think I Know, and What I'd Like to Think', in Solomon 
(Ed), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions, p.65
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On the other hand, the negative emotions attached to the concept are part of what makes the concept 
one of something bad.
The two domains here -  the rational and the emotional -  are not the same thing, but they are 
also not separate. Both Jaggar and de Sousa see emotions as being able to highlight aspects of the 
world we experience, and draw our attention to the ones that seem relevant. Furthermore, the 
meaning we make of the world is influenced by the emotional character of certain concepts, such as 
infidelity. Both of these roles are important in helping us to be the kind of agents that we are. Firstly, 
we simply cannot take in everything about the world all at once. In guiding what we pay attention to 
in this way, emotion plays an important guiding role, enabling us to function as believers in the world. 
Furthermore, the influence of emotion on the richness of meaning we can gain from the world plays 
an epistemic role as well. For Jaggar, concepts are partly constituted by the relevant emotions. The 
interplay between beliefs and emotions enables us to make much better sense of the world. The 
difference between the concept of infidelity, and the concept of a polyamorous relationship is one 
example of this. There are factual differences between the two things, but the difference in their 
emotional character is also important for fully understanding the difference between the two. 
Someone who lives in a society that has the first concept but not the second would not have a full 
understanding of what was happening if she encountered a polyamorous relationship. Furthermore, 
she would not fully understand the difference until she came to understand the emotions attached to 
the second concept rather than the first.
Peter Goldie has a picture similar to Jaggar and de Sousa, but he also focuses on the ways in 
which the relationship between emotions and beliefs can go wrong. He argues that emotions can play 
a significant epistemic role, in a way that makes us more effective and efficient epistemic agents, but 
also leaves us open to "skew[ing] the epistemic landscape"43 in such a way that we end up with fixed 
beliefs.
On Goldie's account, emotions (including their physiological, phenomenological component - 
feelings) are intentional, and often involve judgements about the intentional object. So when I feel 
anger at a perceived wrong, that emotion is about the object -  the perceived wrong -  but also involves 
a judgement that the object is appropriate to anger. The object having the "emotion-proper 
property"44 is what justifies both the feeling and the judgement.
On this picture, emotions can be an important epistemic tool. Goldie, in a move similar to Jaggar 
and de Sousa argues that emotion can draw our attention to aspects of the world. Goldie characterises 
this as being more sensitive to what is going on around us. He argues that
43 Goldie, 'Emotion, Feeling and Knowledge of the world', p. 99
44 Goldie, 'Emotion, Feeling and Knowledge of the world', p. 97
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[Emotions] can enable us to see things in their true light and to make justified perceptual 
judgments in ways that we would not otherwise be able to do: emotions can reveal 
saliences that we might not otherwise recognize with the same speed and reliability. For 
example, we can immediately see that something is disgusting in a way that we would 
not be capable of if we were not capable of feeling disgust. Our emotional dispositions 
can, so to speak, attune us to the world around us, enabling us quickly and reliably to see 
things as they really are, and thus to respond as we should. In short, emotions enable us 
to get things right.45
Goldie worries, however, that emotions might also have a skewing impact on our epistemic lives. The 
emotions and judgements that we have in response to an object ought to be justified by properties of 
the object. For an emotion to be justified there must be reason for that emotion -  its intentional object 
has to actually have the emotion-proper property. The issue for Goldie is that we tend to access the 
emotion or judgement first, and then go back to try and find the reason for it. So we feel anger at 
someone's actions, make the judgement that their actions are worthy of anger, and then justify that 
by post-hoc appeals to features of the action. This can be a reasonable response, when one is 
responding in proportion to genuine features of the action, and when those features genuinely have 
the emotion-proper property. Often, though, we are being influenced by emotions when we are 
unaware of them, which means that we are likely to see the situation differently without being able 
to check whether the emotion -  and thus the effect that it is having on our beliefs -  is justified. In 
addition, because we feel the emotion first, and then engage with the justification for it, what 
sometimes happens is that we come up with rationalisations instead of justifications. We find reasons 
for our emotions even when the object we are responding to does not have the emotion-proper 
property.
On a view of emotion drawn from Jaggar, de Sousa, and Goldie's views, emotions sensitise 
and attune us to the world, both through drawing our attention to certain features of the world, and 
through partly constituting the meaning we make of the world. This is a vital epistemic project, but it 
does leave us open to making judgements based on emotions and backstopping the evidence. We 
ought rather to make the judgement as a response to both emotional insight, and evidence of 
whatever we are reacting to having the emotion-proper property.
Given this, it is easy to see how emotional components might cause to us engage in the 
phenomena. If we have a particular emotional reaction to an event, person, state of the world, etc., 
then it is possible that we can form judgements -  and maintain those judgements -  without 
necessarily paying attention to whether whatever we are responding to has the emotion-proper
45 Goldie, 'Emotion, Feeling and Knowledge of the world', pp. 98-99
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property. The emotion tells us that there is a certain response we ought to have, but we do not engage 
with the evidence in order to substantiate this. Rather, we engage with the evidence in such a way 
that we find support for what our emotional state tells us, however unconsciously, is the case. 
Engaging in hyper-criticality is one way in which we could do this -  we hold the belief we have formed 
on the basis of our emotional response steady, and engage very critically with evidence that 
disconfirms that belief, while accepting without too much critical analysis evidence which confirms it. 
We feel that the belief must be true, and we engage with the evidence as such.
One reason we do tend to trust our emotions is that we assume that we would not have 
emotional responses for no reason. The problem with this is that there could be factors playing a role 
in developing our emotions that are not to do with the properties or characteristics of whatever we 
are reacting to. It is difficult to spell out the ways in which this might work in the abstract, so I will 
focus on the kind that might cause someone to have fixed sexually prejudiced beliefs.
Emotion could be related to the desire to hold a belief steady in the sense that the desire 
either to continue to feel a particular emotion, or to begin to feel it, might give us a motivation to hold 
particular beliefs. The sexually prejudiced person might, for example, be tempted to hold sexually 
prejudiced beliefs steady because she fears feeling outcast by her church group if she gives them up. 
She may fear the possible repercussions46 of coming to disagree with them about something like 
homosexuality -  the alienation, the loss of the feeling that she belongs to a community, the safeness 
of a religious support system etc. The process by which the desire turns into actual belief, or causes 
one to hold a particular belief steady, would have to be unconscious. Common consensus is that we 
cannot choose whether to believe something or not -  and we cannot consciously believe for non­
evidential reasons.
The sexually prejudiced person might also be motivated to hold onto sexually prejudiced 
beliefs because admitting that she is wrong about them says something about her character. We value 
being the kind of people who do not unfairly discriminate. We also tend to feel shame for past actions 
that we now feel were wrong. Given this, she might think something along the lines of "am I really the 
kind of person who believed/did that?" Avoiding these kind of emotions can affect our willingness to 
change prejudicial beliefs.
Furthermore, even if we are responding to some property of whoever or whatever we are 
reacting to, there is no guarantee that the emotional response we have will be the best one we could 
have had in that situation. It is difficult, of course, to spell out exactly what it might mean to say that 
someone is experiencing an inappropriate emotion, but I do think that we can do this. We do
46 I could, of course, be wrong about the repercussions -  they may be more accepting than I anticipate. I 
suspect, however, that in many cases these fears might be justified.
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prescribe, to some extent at least, what emotional reactions are appropriate to a situation, person, or 
object. Someone who responds with a great deal of anger when faced with a small aggravation is seen 
as being irrational in some way, even if they do not act on that anger. Similarly, if someone fails to feel 
anger at deep injustice, we tend to think that there is something lacking in their emotional response. 
I would argue that, in cases where the sexually prejudiced person is responding to someone's sexuality 
in particular with negative emotions such as disgust, disappointment, anger etc., she is responding 
inappropriately to a feature of LGBTIAQ people. Of course, the sexually prejudiced person might argue 
that I am failing to respond appropriately to a feature of LGBTIAQ people. Again, both of us could have 
emotional commitments that we then justify with the evidence we can gather.
One might argue that this is not, strictly speaking, an epistemic problem. Feeling 
inappropriately could be seen as being in the domain of morality, rather than epistemology -  and 
indeed it presumably does have moral implications, especially if the feelings guide action. Given the 
picture of the relationships between beliefs and emotions above, however, inappropriate emotions 
have epistemic consequences as well, particularly if they spark off the kind of backwards justification 
that Goldie describes.
Essentially, then, because of the relationship between emotions and beliefs, emotions can 
affect our willingness to engage in the right way with the evidence for particular beliefs. Because we 
sometimes use our emotions as a starting point, and engage with the evidence in order to justify the 
emotion, rather than judging the emotion based on the evidence, emotions can cause us to engage in 
hyper-criticality and idee fixe. This can either be because we have an interest in maintaining that 
belief, or because we have strong emotions about a particular state of affairs, feature of the world, or 
person.
Idee fixe and hyper-criticality thus make sense from the perspective of emotion as a 
motivating factor for holding beliefs steady. In terms of polarisation, it seems to me that an emotional 
need to continue to hold a belief might lead us to respond by having our beliefs become polarized.
I mentioned earlier in this chapter that we want to be right about ethical beliefs. I also argued 
that there might be something irrational going on in the case of polarisation, because we seem to be 
taking what we perceive to be weak evidence for the position that opposes ours as positive evidence 
for our own view. I argued that seeing evidence in this way might be part of an attitude that sees 
argument as a kind of battle. Given this, it seems at least plausible that the influence of strong 
emotions might heighten this tendency. A challenge to an emotion one is feeling might cause one to 
end up having a stronger emotional reaction. If the challenge makes us defensive, the heightened 
emotional state, tied in with the battlefield attitude towards argument, might serve as an additional 
motivation to engage in this phenomenon.
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Emotion's effect on belief, then, means that the emotional importance of a belief can serve 
as a motivation -  and unconscious one -  to engage in the phenomena. In the following section, I will 
argue that our attitudes can also do so.
2.4.2. Attitudes
An attitude towards something can best be described as a disposition to act and feel in certain ways 
and believe certain things. So "[a] person with a certain attitude toward something S (a particular or 
kind of object, property or event) will be, among other things, attentive to certain features of S, 
inclined to describe or understand S in certain ways, disposed to feel certain emotions toward S, 
disposed to certain beliefs toward S, disposed to praise or blame S in certain conditions, and disposed 
to act in certain ways toward S."47 On this definition, emotion and belief are both components of 
attitudes -  or at least attitudes overarch them in some ways. The picture of the mutual influence on 
each other of emotions and beliefs that I described in the previous section fits into this view of 
attitudes. If tendencies towards emotion and belief both fall under the label of attitudes, then it is not 
surprising that, as components of attitudes, they have an influence on each other.
We tend to try and maintain a kind of unity or harmony in our relationships towards things. 
Discord worries us. If someone has an attitude of disgust towards homosexuality, but believes that 
sexual prejudice is wrong, there is going to be discord between her attitude (particularly her emotions 
and desires) and her beliefs. An attitude of disgust involves negative emotions and probably negative 
behaviour responses. When one is disgusted by something, one would likely try to avoid coming into 
contact with it, for example. So if the person in question is disgusted by homosexuality, she may tend 
to avoid spending time with homosexual people. She may tend to hold negative emotions about 
people based on their sexuality. She may even flinch away from physical contact with someone who 
is homosexual, or something similar. If she knows that the sexual orientation of the people in question 
is what is causing her to respond negatively to them, and she simultaneously believes that sexual 
prejudice is wrong, there will be discord between her beliefs, and her tendencies to feel and behave 
in certain ways towards homosexual people. This kind of discord is uncomfortable, and I think part of 
why we try and avoid changing beliefs that are related to strong attitudes is that we do not want to 
create internal conflict between our attitudes and beliefs. Such conflict requires us to work to 
reconcile the two conflicting elements.
47 Jones, W, Philosophy and the Ethical Significance of Spectatorship: An Introduction to Ethics at the Cinema' 
in Jones and Vice, (Ed.) Ethics at the Cinema, p. 4
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In the case where one has a belief that is in line with the rest of one's attitude, if one's belief 
does change, it would create what I will call a rogue element -  a component of the attitude which is 
not in line with the rest of that attitude. I might dislike ice-skating, and believe that there are sports 
that would be much better for me to do. If I then continue to ice-skate because all my friends enjoy it, 
then my tendency towards acting in this way -  going ice-skating -  does not fit with the rest of my 
attitude towards the sport. It is the rogue element of my attitude towards ice-skating. My tendencies 
towards action (my tendency to go ice-skating when asked), is in conflict with my tendency to feel 
negatively about the action (to dislike it, which would normally lead to me avoiding it). It is also in 
conflict with my tendency to believe certain things about ice-skating (for example that it is a good way 
to have fun or relieve stress, or an enjoyable way to spend an afternoon). In this case, the discord 
could be caused by another, consistent attitude -  my attitude towards my friends, for example. The 
example of the person who is disgusted by homosexuality, but believes that sexual prejudice is wrong 
would be this kind of rogue element case. Her tendency to act in certain ways towards, and her 
tendency to feel certain things about homosexual people are both in conflict with her beliefs.
Avoiding the discord caused by the development of a rogue element might serve as an 
unconscious motivation to hold a belief steady on the face of counter-evidence.48 In a case where 
someone has a negative attitude towards homosexuality or LGBTIAQ people, and is then faced with 
an argument which suggests that their belief is unjustified, the pull of the attitude could be enough to 
motivate the person to hold that belief steady despite the evidence. It serves, in other words, as a 
motivation for engaging in idee fixe. Hyper-criticality then again comes in, as a way of bringing about 
idee fixe. There may also be other ways in which we maintain that belief steady within the attitude -  
not least that the influence that emotion has on belief might play a role in keeping beliefs in line with 
the rest of the attitude. Though it would be an interesting project to try and work out exactly how we 
might keep the components of our attitudes in line with each other, it is beyond my scope here. I 
simply wish to illustrate that this might be another way in which affective states could have an 
influence on beliefs.
2.4.3. Values.
Values, attitudes and emotions seem to me also to be linked. What we think is valuable is going to 
affect and be affected by what we care about. Values themselves are tied both to beliefs, and to
48 It is worth noting that this has implications for changing beliefs through argument. It suggests that it is 
possible -  one can cause discord through argument, and the person can resolve it in favour of the new belief. I 
think this is right, but that the pull of the attitude is often strong enough that the belief is held steady, rather 
than the belief bringing the attitude with it when it changes.
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emotions. As Jaggar points out, "emotions provide the experiential basis for values"49 -  I feel outrage 
at a moral wrong. Values also underlie emotions, though -  feeling moral outrage presupposes that I 
have made a judgement that something is morally wrong, which presupposes that I have moral beliefs. 
Finally, having an attitude towards something presumably involves some kind of value judgement 
about it. Attitudes often involve either negative or positive connotations. If I have a distrustful attitude 
towards someone, and I value trustworthiness, then part of my attitude involves a value-judgement 
about the person I am distrusting. I judge that the person does not meet the standards for 
trustworthiness, and thus is lacking a valuable quality.
It seems, then, that emotions, attitudes, and beliefs are all related to values. Given what I have 
said so far, this suggests that, insofar as these ties affect beliefs, values are also likely to have an effect 
on beliefs -  an indirect effect, at least.
If, then, I value equal treatment regardless of sexuality, and someone gives me an argument 
for why gay marriage should not be allowed, I am likely to experience certain negative emotions. I 
may be angry, or disappointed. I may be frustrated. These emotional reactions are, I think, based on 
the beliefs I have, but they are also based on what I value. It is possible that, given this situation, I may 
not genuinely engage with the person's argument -  in fact, I am unlikely to. Similarly, if someone who 
is sexually prejudiced values the nuclear family, and believes that gay marriage is opposed to this 
value, then being presented with an argument for marriage equality might give rise to certain negative 
emotions in that person. In both cases, beliefs already held are playing a role. The emotional response 
of both me and the sexually prejudiced person, however, may mean that we engage with the other 
person's argument hyper-critically, in order to engage in idee fixe. In this case, the value is playing the 
more fundamental motivational role, in that it is the value that is causing the emotional state. 
Nonetheless, it is the emotional component that is directly interacting with beliefs.
There is also a link between values and attitudes. The values we hold as part of an attitude are 
likely to contribute to the pull of the attitude on belief when it comes to avoiding discord between our 
beliefs and our attitudes. If something is valuable to us, then it seems to me that it is going to be more 
important to us to avoid discord about it. It is, after all, easier for us to change the attitudes we have 
towards things that are not important, because in this situation, discord does not pose as much of a 
threat to us. We have two options when faced with discord -  we can change the attitude, or we can 
change the component that is at odds with the rest of the attitude. The latter is easier, which might 
cause us to take that path in the same way that we might be motivated to avoid making too many 
changes to our belief webs. In both cases, holding the belief steady is the easiest course of action. It 
may also strike us as the morally better option in the case of a fixed belief about something we have
49 Jaggar, 'Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology', p. 153
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value-based commitments to. I might have a mildly positive attitude towards a company, and a more 
negative or ambivalent attitude towards their main competitor, thinking that the products of the one 
I support are better value for money. Despite this, when presented with evidence that the products 
from the company I prefer are beginning to drop in quality, I may well change my belief about the 
quality of their products, and perhaps the attitude as well. The discord here does not really worry me, 
because it is not important to me. I can resolve it without stress, so changing the belief does not hold 
much danger for me -  I can just shift the attitude with it. I do not strongly value one over the other. If 
I deeply value something about one of the companies, however -  perhaps their environmental 
policies, or their labour policies -  then I am more likely to try and find a way to keep my belief that 
the initial company is still better than the competing company. Similarly, if I have a strong attitude 
towards something that is valuable to me -  for example equality regardless of sexual orientation or 
gender identity -  I am much less likely to be willing to change the belief, and the attitude with it, than 
if it is something that I do not have strong value-based commitments to.
Valuing something is thus likely to motivate emotional responses that then exert influence on 
the way in which we engage with the evidence available to us. It is also likely to affect the strength of 
the pull of our attitudes on our beliefs.
2.6. Quine and Importance.
I do think that the view that the importance of a belief affects our willingness to give it up in response 
to evidence is compatible with a web-of-belief kind of picture. Quine himself may have been sceptical 
of the addition of importance as a factor to consider when one is trying to work out why we hold 
certain beliefs steady in the face of evidence. I think, however, that the essence of what I am taking 
from Quine here -  the web-like structure of belief -  fits in with importance as being relevant, or at 
least is not incompatible with it. The web of belief deals with the evidential, logical connections 
between beliefs, including value-based beliefs. Some of these beliefs are closer to observation than 
others. This structure gives us some insight into why we might be motivated to hold some beliefs 
steady given the epistemic part of their nature. Nothing in this picture, however, precludes the 
possibility of emotion affecting belief. The web of belief is a picture of how beliefs fit together, of their 
structure. This still allows for the possibility that emotions can play a role in informing particular 
beliefs. Furthermore, Quine leaves open the possibility that we can hold any belief steady if we make 
enough changes to the belief web in response to evidence. It is possible that emotion could play a role 
in determining what beliefs we would want to give up on. The web of belief then shifts to 
accommodate that. Because of the importance of the belief, we perhaps engage in hyper-criticality -
42
to avoid the belief that the evidence is good, and thus avoid having to change the important belief. 
We could do this, even if the belief in question were peripheral.
Finally, both emotion and the background beliefs we have can affect what we pay attention 
to in the world. The web-like structure of belief affects what we think is relevant in new information, 
as it is partly the beliefs we have about evidence and so forth that tell us what counts as evidence, 
what is interesting about evidence etc. Emotion, on Jaggar, de Sousa, and Goldie's views, draws our 
attention to what is relevant. While these two factors might not always draw our attention to the 
same features of the world, or the evidence, and may in fact sometimes prioritise different aspects of 
the world, they are perfectly compatible with each other. The web-like structure of belief can cause 
us to hold particular beliefs steady because of their interconnected nature, and because it means that 
the beliefs we already have shape how we see the world. Importance can affect the content of 
particular beliefs. It can affect which features of the world we notice, thus affecting how we manage 
our belief webs. It can also affect which beliefs we choose to maintain within our belief webs.
Essentially, we have at least two different motivations for engaging in idee fixe. The structure 
of our belief-webs means that we have a motivation to hold certain beliefs steady because of their 
centrality. The importance of some beliefs gives us motivation to hold them steady, whether they are 
central or peripheral. These two motivations come apart -  they might sometimes pick out different 
beliefs to be held steady. This does not mean they are incompatible with each other, however. We do 
sometimes have competing claims on our beliefs, in the same way as we sometimes have competing 
moral claims. This does not mean that only one of those factors can have a claim on our beliefs (or our 
moral decisions).
I have tried, in this chapter, to sketch out an account of the motivations we might have for 
engaging in the phenomena -  particularly the central one of idee fixe. The picture I have set out gives 
a picture of belief and emotion that tries to capture the fact that we need to make sense of new 
evidence from the perspective of the beliefs -  and to a certain extent values and emotions -  that we 
already have. After all, the picture I have set out shows how the way our belief systems work can go 
wrong, but also how our beliefs work at all. In the next chapter, I will argue that balancing the fact 
that we need to work from our existing perspectives with the need to respond to new information 
well is an epistemic virtue.
43
Chapter 3: When is it justifiable to hold beliefs steady?
Apart from polarisation, a Quinean account of belief gives an explanation of the motivational basis for 
the phenomena in a way that makes sense of the tendency to engage in them, at least up to a point. 
After all, central beliefs are ones which are connected to many other beliefs. It thus not only makes 
motivational sense to hold these beliefs steady, it also makes rational sense. Roughly, if a belief fits in 
with the rest of our beliefs, and makes sense within the way we see the world, then one could argue 
that the other beliefs one has provides some support for the belief in question. A proposition fitting 
in with the rest of what we know about the world seems to give us a basic reason to think that that 
proposition is at least basically plausible. If, for example, I mention to someone that I have been having 
a lot of headaches, and she tells me that they are likely tension-related, I may be inclined to believe 
her based on my knowledge that I am unusually stressed at the moment, that muscle tension can 
manifest as pain, etc. I do not necessarily have to go to the doctor for this belief to be plausible, though 
it might be an idea to do so if I want to be sure of the cause of my headaches. Our other beliefs might 
make it reasonable to accept, at least to a certain extent, a new proposition without necessarily having 
extra evidence for it.
Not only does Quine's picture of belief make it seem reasonable to hold onto beliefs in the 
face of evidence, emotions also play quite an important epistemic role. The accounts I have described 
and endorsed argue that emotions can inform us about the world. They become problematic when 
they move from informing us to blinding us to evidence, or causing us to engage with evidence on the 
assumption that the emotion is responding to an emotion-proper property actually possessed by the 
object in question without evidence that this assumption is justified. The line between emotions 
telling us something important about the world, and skewing our perceptions of it, is not particularly 
clear. It is plausible that there could be cases where someone is failing to respond to evidence, because 
her emotional responses are telling her that there is something wrong. In the time before the term 
sexual harassment had been coined, for example, someone experiencing sexual harassment felt that 
something more than flirting was happening. Her negative emotions alerted her to the fact that 
something was not right, even though the dominant interpretation at the time meant that all the 
evidence fit the definition of flirting, rather than something else. In this case, she is not responding to 
the evidence as someone else at the time might have, but this places her in a better epistemic position, 
not a worse one.50 She is not ignoring the evidence, she is challenging the dominant interpretation of 
it.
50 The example of sexual harassment is adapted from Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the 
Ethics of Knowing, p.149.
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It may then be that beliefs that are both central and important ought to be held steady in the 
face of evidence -  or at least that they rationally can.
Despite this, it seems to me that there are worrisome aspects of the phenomena which are 
not explained in such a way that they cease to be problematic. It seems to me that Quine's lesson -  
that we try and avoid re-arranging our belief systems -  becomes problematic when we slip from using 
background beliefs to make sense of new information to being rigid and unable to respond to new 
information as we should. The former is reasonable the latter is not.
Furthermore, there are instances of emotions influencing beliefs in ways that are 
epistemically problematic. Emotions can cause us to shut out evidence, engaging with it hyper­
critically instead of re-interpreting or challenging the dominant ways of engaging with it, as happened 
in the sexual harassment case.
In this section, I will argue that managing to find the right level of evidence-responsiveness, 
given these two factors, is an intellectual or epistemic virtue. This level of evidence-responsiveness 
would need to be one that enables one to both use one's background beliefs, and be sensitive to the 
fact that emotion can tell one things about the world. It would need to do this without either of these 
things making one fail to respond to evidence that one ought to respond to. I will argue that, provided 
Lord, Ross and Lepper are to be trusted, their experiment shows us that we often do the latter when 
we engage in the phenomena. This means that we tend not to be intellectually virtuous when it comes 
to beliefs prone to the phenomena.
I take it that intellectual virtues would be traits that allow us to excellently inquire about the 
world. The virtuous mean would be the feature of one's intellectual characteristics that helps one to 
inquire excellently. As with most other Aristotelian-style virtues, there would be two corresponding 
vices. Given that the virtuous mean involves negotiating between these two vices, I will spell the vices 
out first, then discuss the virtue that lies between them.
3.1. The Vices
The first, and probably more common, of the two vices in question is what I will call rigidity. The second 
is naivety or gullibility51. The former would mean holding onto our beliefs too strongly because they 
are embedded in our belief webs. We fail to revise a belief which the evidence does actually show is 
wrong. The latter would mean giving up on our beliefs too easily in response to counter-evidence -  
failing, for example, to be critical of evidence. We need to strike a balance between these two 
extremes in order to be epistemically virtuous.
51 I will continue to use the term gullibility. It is taken from Spiegel, 'Open-Mindedness and Intellectual 
Humility', which I will make use of later in this chapter.
45
Gullibility is a problem because giving up on beliefs too quickly leaves us without the resources 
to critically engage with new evidence. Background beliefs -  about causality, about what certain 
evidence means etc. -  are necessary in order to connect evidence with a hypothesis. For evidence to 
be meaningful, we have to have beliefs about the world that enable us to make sense of what the new 
evidence is telling us. In order for a falling apple to lead me to a belief about gravity, I have to believe 
that all objects behave the same when they are dropped. We cannot look at new hypotheses and new 
evidence from an empty, neutral viewpoint. There is no view from nowhere. If we did not hold 
mathematics steady, for example, most experimentation would be impossible, certainly in the field of 
physics. This connection between background beliefs and new evidence is not yet to do with epistemic 
virtue -  all I have said so far is that we need tools to make sense of new evidence, and that those tools 
are to be found in our existing beliefs. When one brings in the idea of critically engaging with new 
evidence, however, it becomes clearer how gullibility is a problem. In order to engage critically with 
new evidence, one has to test it against the standards one already has, and the things that one already 
knows. If we give up on beliefs in response to new evidence too easily, then the new evidence is not 
being well tested. Furthermore, when one's previous beliefs are well justified, it makes epistemic 
sense that this serves as a reason to maintain them in the face of some contradictory observation, at 
least at first. I should not give up on my belief that 2+2=4 as soon as only three socks come out of the 
washing machine. On the other hand, beliefs do need to change, as, sometimes, do our epistemic 
standards. As we learn more about the world, and come across new evidence in it, we should realise 
that beliefs we hold are unjustified -  and if evidence really does sufficiently show this, we must change 
our beliefs.
Affective states, particularly emotions, in virtue of having an effect on belief, can have an 
impact on whether or not we are being gullible. I think this effect can play out in two ways. We can be 
gullible if we too easily give up beliefs that affective states tell us we should hold steady. We can also 
be gullible when it comes to affective states, however, trusting them too much. So if I am really 
uncomfortable with the results of a study that challenges one of my beliefs -  if I am experiencing 
negative emotions about it, or it conflicts with a deeply-held value or attitude -  then it is a clue that it 
needs to be interrogated further. These things can tell us about the world -  attitudes through 
emotions, and values both through emotions and in their own right. Here, it is me ignoring emotions 
(or attitudes, or values) that makes me gullible. On the other hand, if my emotions are in support of 
new evidence, and I buy into the new evidence straight away because of this, I am also being gullible. 
I should not accept a study claiming to prove that climate change is not as bad as we thought it was, 
even if my emotional response to it is positive. Though my reaction to emotion in each of these cases
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is diametrically opposed, the end result -  giving up beliefs in response to new evidence too easily -  is 
gullible.
Rigidity, on the other hand, happens when our commitment to our already-held beliefs and 
epistemic standards is so strong that we fail to change our beliefs in response to evidence that is 
already good. There are both epistemic and moral reasons to think that rigidity is problematic, but I 
will focus here on the epistemic ones.
A fairly widely accepted premise is that we must see our own beliefs as being based on 
evidence. Jonathan Adler in Belief's Own Ethics takes this kind of position as a starting point, arguing 
that we cannot choose to believe something for pragmatic reasons. He supports evidentialism, the 
view that beliefs should be based on evidence, and the strength of the evidence for a belief should 
determine how strongly we hold it. He phrases this in terms of what he calls the subjective principle 
of sufficient reason -  "[w]hen one attends to any of one's beliefs, one must regard it as believed for 
sufficient or adequate reasons."52 On Adler's view, as well as in literature around the aim of belief, the 
view is that we must see our own beliefs as being held for epistemic reasons that adequately support 
them. This is not to say that we cannot have beliefs that are held for non-epistemic reasons (or bad 
reasons for that matter), but we cannot be aware of this without our belief being undercut. I think 
that this would be true even of beliefs that have been influenced by affective states. We may be aware 
of the fact that a particular belief is deeply valuable to us, for example, but we also have to believe 
that it is true, independent of our valuing it, in order to keep believing it.
Adler's characterisation of evidentialism is perhaps a little stronger than is appropriate for a 
virtue-epistemological view of belief. I have argued that both a Quinean picture of belief, and the 
picture of how affective states affect belief suggests that it is sometimes reasonable for non-epistemic 
factors to affect beliefs. One might argue that, insofar as our affective states are informing us about 
the world, they count as evidence. I am a little suspicious of this. Affective states attune us to the 
world, but they do not directly support conclusions. Nonetheless, I think that the view that affective 
states, and the interconnected nature of belief are both compatible with the spirit of Adler's view.
Though Adler does not argue for this, it seems to me that a commitment to evidentialism 
relies on the view that evidence has a claim on our beliefs. By its nature, evidence is a reason to believe 
that something is true. This does not mean that we must automatically believe anything evidence 
suggests. It can be misleading, it can be misinterpreted, and it can be difficult to understand. But 
strong evidence for a position or belief constitutes a reason to think that the belief is true. If there is 
strong evidence for two different beliefs, then there is reason to be concerned about believing either 
of them, at least without further thought, because it means that there is both good reason to believe
52 Adler, Belief's Own Ethics, p. 26
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and good reason to disbelieve each of the claims. The fact that evidence has a claim on our beliefs, 
and that the strength of the evidence has implications for our beliefs, is compatible with the view that 
both affective states and the interconnected nature of belief can affect our beliefs. Evidence having a 
claim on us does not mean that affective states do not tell us about the world, nor that we can 
interpret evidence without testing it against already held standards of belief. It is how to interpret the 
weight of evidence that is at stake when it comes to the Quinean picture of belief, and the effect of 
affective states on our beliefs.
Additionally, rigidity is epistemically problematic because it simply is not useful for achieving 
the ends of inquiry. Scientific advancement -  in fact, any kind of advancement in inquiry -  requires 
some kind of adaptability. In order to be adaptable, I need to be able to give up on beliefs that are not 
useful in response to new situations or new evidence. If scientific advancement (for example) is going 
to get anywhere, there has to be a point at which we are willing to radically change our belief webs. 
This, I take it, is what is happening with paradigm shifts. If we are to achieve our aim of engaging with 
the world in more effective and better ways (and this is an aim I take it we do have), then adaptability 
is going to be important. Rigidity is also a poor way of achieving another important end of inquiry -  
getting at truth. We are sometimes dramatically wrong about things, and holding too strongly onto 
our beliefs will prevent us from being open to that possibility. That is not to say that we always have 
to keep it in mind, but when we are confronted by evidence that we are wrong about something, it is 
important that we consider that evidence on its own merit -  and this is going to involve looking at the 
justification for our own beliefs.
It would be impractical to re-arrange our belief webs at the slightest sign of disconfirming 
evidence -  it would be ridiculous to give up on basic mathematical beliefs every time I put two pairs 
of socks in the washing machine and only three come out. At the same time, we do sometimes need 
to change our beliefs in response to evidence, or we would never advance our knowledge. We need 
to strike a balance between these two extremes -  these two vices -  in order to effectively balance the 
need to respond to evidence and the need to hold justified beliefs steady (in the face of forged 
evidence, for example).
Affective states can both support and interfere with this project. They can draw our attention 
to features of the world that we have not before noticed, and may otherwise not have noticed. 
Sympathy for an exhausted student, for example, might lead one to notice that she is struggling, and 
draw conclusions about the support available for students who are not coping with content. 
Furthermore, as Jaggar argues, emotions can alert us to the fact that there is something problematic 
in the dominant interpretation of a phenomenon -  as is the case where someone who is experiencing 
sexual harassment, but does not yet have access to the term. The emotions tell her that something is
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going on that is not flirting, though the dominant interpretation of the available evidence says 
otherwise. Ignoring emotions such as these can lead one to having a rigid belief system. In the former 
case, I think we can hold the person responsible if she ignores the emotions involved. In the latter, I 
think we probably cannot do so. In the former case, there is nothing obscuring the relevant 
interpretation of the problem. In the latter case there is -  the dominant societal interpretation. In the 
former case, ignoring the evidence might contribute to holding onto a belief that the support 
structures available to students are sufficient in an epistemically vicious way. In the sexual harassment 
case, I do not think that the person experiencing sexual harassment can be held responsible if she 
disregards her emotions. She is not necessarily being epistemically vicious. Ignoring emotional factors 
can therefore lead us to being rigid, but so can letting emotions prevent us from appreciating the full 
weight of evidence. In the Lord, Ross, and Lepper case, for example, the participants who disagreed 
with capital punishments' negative emotional responses to capital punishment may have affected 
their hyper-critical engagement with the evidence, thus leading them to be rigid.
It seems to me that the participants in the Lord, Ross and Lepper experiment were, through 
the phenomena, being rigid. They were presented with two sets of experiments, which met roughly 
the same standards. All studies were designed to be convincing by standards of social psychology at 
the time. Despite the fact that the two sets of evidence met the same standards, they evaluated the 
evidence against their position as being bad, whereas they evaluated the evidence supporting their 
position as being good. They were presented with evidence that, by their own standards, ought to 
have been good evidence (given that they evaluated the equivalent supporting evidence as being 
good), but which contradicted their already held commitments. Of course, in real life the evidence is 
often less clear -  sometimes it takes the form of arguments (which can be disagreed with), it is often 
inconclusive etc. Nonetheless, situations where we are presented with good evidence that contradicts 
our beliefs do occur. It might be more difficult to know when evidence is good outside of the 
laboratory, but we do generally have some idea of what counts as good evidence and what does not.
The Lord, Ross and Lepper participants, then, were presented with good evidence -  I want to 
re-iterate, evidence that they ought to have seen as good by their own standards -  against their initial 
beliefs, as well as good evidence for their initial beliefs. They responded by being very critical of the 
evidence that challenged their beliefs, and not very critical of the evidence that supported their 
beliefs. This is rational up to a point. It is reasonable, given strong initial beliefs, to want to come out 
of a debate having proved to a reasonable level of satisfaction that one's initial position was right. This 
is particularly true if the beliefs in question are important to one, as may have been the case with the 
participants. Furthermore, in the interests of avoiding gullibility, it was reasonable for the participants 
to use their own beliefs as a starting point. The problem comes in, however, when that desire -  the
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desire to hold one's belief-web steady -  influences the way one engages with the evidence at one's 
disposal. The evidence ought to be engaged with on its own merits, rather than on the merits -  or lack 
thereof -  one wishes it had. Given strong contradictory evidence, the participants ought to have taken 
it as a reason to re-examine the justification for their own views. Lord, Ross and Lepper report that 
the participants engaged with the contradictory evidence, but in such a way that it was clear they 
were not engaging with all the available evidence in the same way. They spent more time on the 
contradictory evidence than on the evidence that confirmed their position. They were very critical of 
the contradictory evidence, and very uncritical of the evidence that supported their initial position. 
The participants evaluated the two studies based on their previous commitments rather than on the 
strength of the actual evidence. They were not engaging with the evidence on its own merits. This has 
ceased to be a case of avoiding gullibility, and has moved into a case of being rigid. I am not necessarily 
saying that they ought to have changed the belief at the end of the study. They ought, however, to 
have engaged with the evidence more equally, and been willing to re-examine the belief in light of the 
evidence.
Perhaps the best way of explaining what is going wrong with the way the participants were 
engaging with the evidence given to them is to refer to Marc Champagne's paper 'Disjunctivism and 
the Ethics of Disbelief'. He argues that we do not have a standing duty to continuously evaluate and 
re-evaluate our beliefs. Instead he argues that we ought to reflect on our beliefs when we come across 
something in the world which does not fit with them -  when there is "a salient discordance with the 
world."53 When we have a certain expectation, and that expectation is frustrated by a state of the 
world, we ought to reflect on our beliefs. It seems to me that strong contradictory evidence should 
serve as such a frustration. If one believes that capital punishment is not effective, a study showing 
that it has deterred crime is a frustrated expectation, and should cause one to reflect on one's own 
belief -  not only on the opposing evidence. The participants ought to have critically reflected on their 
beliefs. They did not examine the evidence for their own position much at all. They did try to engage 
critically with the oppositional evidence -  they did not simply dismiss it -  but they also did not engage 
with it on its own merit. If they had, they would have recognised the merit of the studies as compared 
to the studies that supported their view. They were rigid rather than conservative in that they held 
their beliefs steady in such a way that they no longer engaged properly with evidence. Doing so is 
harmful to inquiring excellently, and is as such not epistemically virtuous.
One possible challenge to my description of the phenomena as being instances of epistemic 
vice can be found in Thomas Kelly's paper 'Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization'. Kelly 
argues that the requirement to give all evidence we encounter equal weight. He argues that it is
53 Champagne, 'Disjunctivism and the ethics of disbelief', p. 154
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reasonable to give little attention to confirming evidence. It is when we come across disconfirming 
evidence that we need to pay attention to it. He uses the example of thinking someone is honest. If 
one has this initial belief, then all incidents where the person behaves with honesty will count as 
confirming evidence. It is perfectly reasonable, Kelly argues, to take these incidents as evidence 
without interrogating it. It is only if we are confronted with evidence that seems to disconfirm the 
initial belief that we need to interrogate it.54
Kelly also argues that it is possible that, even given two people who have access to the same 
body of evidence in a narrow sense, they might not have the same evidence in a broad sense. He 
argues that having the same set of evidence in the narrow sense -  the sense of having "relevant 
information about the world"55 -  does not necessarily mean that two people will have the same 
evidence in the broad sense. The broad sense of evidence includes how many (and which) alternative 
hypotheses that might explain the evidence, the agent is aware of. This is, in turn, affected by the 
initial beliefs that the agent has. Someone who believes that capital punishment deters crime will 
assume that the hypothesis "capital punishment is a crime deterrent" will explain evidence that crime 
statistics are higher in states without capital punishment. Someone who does not believe that, will 
look for alternative hypotheses. Provided they are not ad-hoc, Kelly argues that this is perfectly 
reasonable. According to Kelly, then, our initial beliefs can affect the epistemic path we take, and thus 
what we end up believing.
The implication of both of these points is, of course, that it was reasonable for the participants 
in the Lord, Ross and Lepper experiment to be unequally critical of the evidence. I do not think that 
Kelly's argument successfully proves this. The first concern -  that we cannot be expected to give all 
evidence equal considerations -  seems to me to be right, but it also seems to be incomplete. It is true 
that confirming evidence when it is presented to us by itself does not necessarily warrant excessive 
scrutiny. On the other hand, when we do come across disconfirming evidence, it ought to cause us to 
re-evaluate our initial positions. When I come across good evidence that someone I previously 
considered honest has been dishonest, I may interrogate that evidence critically, but I ought also to 
re-look at my initial belief. The new evidence calls into question the sincerity of previous examples of 
honesty, for example.
In terms of the second concern, I think that in the Lord, Ross and Lepper study, the 
contradictory evidence ought to have caused the participants to examine whether the hypothesis they 
started with was the right one. Again, the evidence was designed to be good. It is perhaps alright for 
the participants to have been critical of disconfirming evidence, but this does not mean that they were
54 Kelly, 'Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization', p. 623
55 Kelly, 'Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization', p. 628
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justified in treating the evidence in as skewed a manner as they did. To phrase it as I did a few 
paragraphs ago, the "salient discordance with the world"56 was present.
One might also argue that the participants were not actually being rigid when they responded 
to the evidence that was given to them, because the evidence that was given to them was limited. It 
was to do with deterrence -  the studies showed that capital punishment was either effective or 
ineffective as a crime deterrent. People might not change their minds on capital punishment in 
response to this evidence because they have separate reasons for believing capital punishment to be 
right or wrong. It might be right or wrong separately from its efficacy in deterring crime. This does not, 
however, change whether or not it is a deterrent to crime. Someone who wanted to argue against 
capital punishment based on other reasons is justified in doing so, but this should not influence how 
they respond to evidence that does relate to efficacy -  except insofar as it allows them to dismiss it as 
irrelevant. This was not, however, what the participants did.
3.2. The Virtue
Given how virtues work, the epistemic virtue I am looking for will fall between gullibility and rigidity. 
It will involve being responsive to new evidence, but not to the extent that one fails to critically engage 
with the evidence, and ends up giving up on beliefs too easily.
W.V. Quine and J.S. Ullian describe a virtue which seems to me to be trying to fit the bill, 
though they do not phrase it in terms of our ability to make sense of new information from a 
foundation of background beliefs. They describe something called conservatism57, a virtue which 
applies to a way of evaluating hypotheses. They claim that when we develop a hypothesis to explain 
new (or existing) information or phenomena, it may be the case that "In order to explain the 
happenings that we are inventing it to explain, the hypothesis may have to conflict with some of our 
previous beliefs; but the fewer the better. Acceptance of a hypothesis is of course like acceptance of 
any belief in that it demands rejection of whatever conflicts with it. The less rejection of prior beliefs 
required, the more plausible the hypothesis -  other things being equal."58 This last claim is not 
something that one has to defend in order to claim that the fewer of our beliefs a hypothesis 
contradicts the better, but it is one that Quine and Ullian endorse. I will suggest below that their view 
is a little strong, and ought to be combined with an intellectual virtue that offsets the tendency 
towards rigidity that I think this claim endorses.
56 Champagne, 'Disjunctivism and the ethics of disbelief', p. 154
57 This is the term they use.
58 Quine and Ullian, The Web of Belief, p. 40
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Adapted to fit responses to new evidence, and interpreted from the perspective of a web of 
belief view of belief, conservatism as an intellectual virtue means that the best interpretation of new 
evidence -  the best hypothesis about what the evidence means -  is the one which contradicts the 
fewest of our already-held beliefs. This seems to be an attempt at avoiding gullibility, but without 
falling into rigidity. Our previously held beliefs are given some standing, but Quine and Ullian do 
recognise that at least some of them may need to change.
This seems, at least initially, a plausible view. I do, however, have some concerns about using 
Quine's term. Firstly, though this is not in itself a reason to abandon the term, or the concept attached 
to it, the term conservatism as used here is not uncontroversial. There are various other views that 
could be called to mind by the term. In its simplest form, conservatism is taken to be the view that "an 
agent is in some measure justified in maintaining a belief simply in virtue of the fact that the agent 
has that belief."59 David Christensen, D. Goldstick60, and (to some extent) Hamid Vahid take this to be 
at least a version of the doctrine. Christensen and Goldstick see it as the paradigmatic example of 
conservatism, while Vahid adds two more versions. The first is that we should give up on a belief only 
when we have positive evidence that our justification for it is suspect, and the second is that we are 
justified in maintaining our own beliefs even when we become aware of evidentially equivalent 
alternative beliefs.61 None of these are what I am looking for -  and I do not think that they are what 
Quine and Ullian mean. Furthermore, I think that their definition is both the least problematic of the 
four, and the one which best captures the virtue I am trying to describe.
The first version -  the view that beliefs are justified simply in virtue of being held -  is not 
entailed by a Quinean picture of belief, despite the standing our already-held beliefs have on this 
account. Conservatism primarily applies to new beliefs and hypotheses, and so does not directly entail 
that existing beliefs are justified simply in virtue of being held. One might think that judging new 
hypotheses by how many previous beliefs they contradict suggests that the already existing beliefs 
are seen as being justified simply in virtue of being held, but that is not the case. The new belief may 
be justified by its connection to other beliefs, but this does not mean that we are taking those previous 
beliefs to be justified just because we hold them. It might be the case that conservatism applies to 
already-held beliefs as well, in the sense that currently-held beliefs and hypotheses should ideally not 
conflict with each other. I'm not sure, however, that this would be saying more than that we do not 
like having contradictory beliefs. We could have loosely-held hypotheses -  something like "I think this 
is probably how this sort-of works, but it contradicts some of my beliefs". This still involves the 
recognition that the contradiction is a problem. It also does not mean that the previous beliefs or
59 Christensen, 'Conservatism in Epistemology', p. 69
60 Goldstick, 'Methodological Conservatism'.
61 Vahid, 'Varieties of Epistemic Conservatism', p. 102
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hypotheses are justified in virtue of being held. A desire for coherence and a distrust of contradiction 
may have a role to play in indicating that a belief's justification ought to be re-examined, but it does 
not have anything positive to say about the justification of beliefs. A belief being coherent with other 
beliefs might give it basic plausibility, but it does not fully justify it to the point where disconfirming 
evidence ought to be ignored. More importantly, whatever justification it has is coming from its 
coherence with other justified beliefs, not from the fact that it is held.
In addition, this view does not take into account that we form false beliefs all the time. 
Holding a belief does not guarantee that one has justification for it. It could have been uncritically 
acquired, and it could have remained unexamined. I, at one point, formed the belief that Budapest 
was in the Middle East, and it was not until a friend was talking about his trip to Hungary that I realised 
that I was mistaken. I did not, even before the contradictory evidence I received through my friend's 
testimony, have a justification for that belief simply by virtue of holding it. Perhaps if I formed that 
belief based on some kind of evidence (even misinterpreted), that evidence would form a justification 
for the belief. Even if this is the case, the justification comes from the evidence, rather than from my 
holding the belief. One might argue that I cannot remember the evidence, but can assume that I had 
evidence at some point, which gives me justification for this belief. This seems to me to be a bit far­
fetched, however. Being in this situation calls for us to suspend belief, perhaps while we look up the 
evidence for it, rather than to hold the belief as being justified. This is not to say that suspending belief 
is necessarily the right course of action in any situation where one becomes aware of an alternative. I 
have argued that becoming aware of good evidence for an alternative ought to cause us to examine 
the belief further. Nonetheless, in the case where one is presented with evidence against a belief that 
one cannot summon any justification for, I think it is the right course of epistemic action.
It might seem as though Quine is committed to at least a weaker version of Vahid's second 
version of conservatism -  that we should give up on a belief only when we have positive evidence that 
our justification for it is suspect. Re-arranging our belief-webs under the virtue of conservatism might 
justify the view that it is gullible to rearrange those webs in the absence of some kind of evidence that 
we should. This is weaker than Vahid's claim, but does involve the requirement that it be positive 
evidence that causes the change in belief-webs. I am happy to agree with this to some extent, but I 
think that some clarification of what counts as evidence that we should rearrange our belief-webs is 
needed.
This version of conservatism, however, also seems to me to be problematic. It ignores the 
connections we have between our beliefs. It is not simply the justification for one belief that has an 
impact on whether or not we should hold it. If other beliefs are connected to that belief, changes or 
challenges to them can have implications that are at least relevant for that belief.
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In addition, I would argue that disconfirming evidence or strongly justified opposing positions 
are good enough reason to re-open the question of a particular belief, in the sense of re-considering 
and re-weighing up evidence. One might end up holding the same belief one did before, but it has at 
least been examined in the light of new evidence. Furthermore, realising something problematic about 
a belief might be enough to call for it to be re-examined. If, for example, one realises that one's belief 
is in conflict with another belief -  whether factual or value-based -  one ought to examine the beliefs 
in question again. The point of Quine's web of belief is that we can choose to re-examine other beliefs 
rather than the one the evidence is, strictly speaking, relevant to. We can, for example, choose to re­
examine our belief in the efficacy of the evidence. I think, however, there are likely to be particular 
beliefs that certain sets of evidence are particularly pertinent to. A DNA test proving that X is Y's parent 
ought to cause Y to re-examine the belief "X is unrelated to me" rather than immediately cause a 
different revision, such as "the person at the lab is trying to make me believe that X is my parent". The 
evidence is far more pertinent to the former belief than it is to the latter. It is quite possible, however, 
that if Y particularly dislikes X, they may end up forming the latter belief, rather than changing the 
former. There may be some cases where it is the case that the DNA test has been compromised, for 
example. Unless one has reason to think that this is the case, the belief that the evidence is particularly 
pertinent to is the one that we think ought to change. This does not necessarily mean that in all cases 
the belief will have to change -  some evidence is not particularly strong, or can be open to more 
interpretations than, a DNA test. Nonetheless, it is often the case that we are aware of which beliefs 
evidence is pertinent to, even if there is not a clear-cut answer to what our final answer with regard 
to what to do about the belief is.
It might also seem that the fact that Quine advocates avoiding the re-arrangement of one's 
belief-web as much as possible means that he is committed to Vahid's third version of the thesis -  the 
claim that we are justified in maintaining a belief despite being aware of evidentially equivalent 
alternatives -  but I do not think that this is the case. Good evidence supporting a competing view, or 
even the presence of disagreement, gives one reason to at least re-examine the justification of one's 
own belief, as well as to examine the justification for the belief supported by one's opponent, or the 
disconfirming evidence. We perhaps should try to avoid re-arranging our belief webs, all things being 
equal -  but the presence of an evidentially equivalent alternative is a sign that all things may not be 
equal, and should lead us to take another look at the justification available. Once we have examined 
the competing position, if we have found it wanting, it may still be the best course of action to hold 
on to the initial belief. Nonetheless, even negative evidence of this sort is relevant to our beliefs. If I 
have always believed that running is entirely good for you, and I come across evidence that it can 
actually be pretty bad for your knees, I have reason to look at my belief again. I may still subsequently
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decide that, all things considered, running actually is pretty good for you, but the evidence has caused 
me to re-examine the belief. This is not direct evidence against the cardio-vascular benefits of running, 
but it affects my belief.
Finally, this version of conservatism does not seem to me to be relevant to a question about 
epistemic virtue. There may be some cases where it is permissible to hold a belief steady in the face 
of evidentially equivalent alternatives -  the question of belief in a divine being is one example. It does 
not, however, have much bearing on how we ought to tend to behave towards evidence. It does not 
give an answer to the question I am asking -  namely what kind of intellectual virtue might be relevant 
to interpreting evidence in the interests of avoiding both rigidity in ones beliefs, and gullibility.
The fact that there is confusion around a term is not, of course, reason by itself to stop using 
the term. One option, when one finds oneself with competing definitions for a term, is to simply pick 
the best definition. I have just argued that Quine and Ullian's definition not only best fits the picture 
of belief that I have set out, it is also the most plausible one.62 I have suggested that we need to make 
sense of new evidence from the perspective of what we already believe, and that we need to use our 
previous beliefs to test new ones. If that perspective takes the form of a set of interconnected beliefs, 
some central and some peripheral, it is reasonable to suppose that new evidence, or a hypothesis to 
explain new evidence, would fit somewhere into this web. Given that we try as much as possible to 
keep our beliefs consistent within this web, the fewer beliefs a new belief or hypothesis contradicts, 
the easier it will be to slot into our belief-webs. Furthermore, if our belief-webs are generally fairly 
accurate, or if we have good justification for the beliefs we already have, then saying the fewer existing 
beliefs a new belief or hypothesis contradicts the better simply means that a new hypothesis that 
contradicts fewer justified  beliefs is better than one which contradicts more. This, it seems to me, 
makes much more sense than any of the alternative definitions of conservatism do.
The version of conservatism that Quine and Ullian use fits well with the Quinean model of 
belief -  terminological confusion is not a good reason to dismiss it. What worries me more, however, 
is that the term only captures part of what I am after. For one thing, it seems unable to account for 
the role of importance in fixed belief. If both the centrality and the importance of a belief play a role 
in its fixed nature, appealing simply to how the interconnected nature of belief makes sense of how 
we ought to respond to evidence does not give us a very clear idea of how to respond to the role of 
importance in fixed beliefs. Furthermore, it seems to me that it captures the sense in which we should 
not be gullible, but it is less easy to see how conservatism avoids rigidity. Quine and Ullian's definition 
seems to me to be focused mainly on avoiding the possibility of error that might come in with dramatic 
changes to our belief-webs -  such as the acceptance of hypotheses that do contradict our beliefs. They
62 Perhaps unsurprisingly, since the account of belief is largely based on a Quinean picture of belief-webs.
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argue that "The truth may indeed be radically remote from our present system of beliefs, so that we 
may need a long series of conservative steps to attain what might have been attained in one rash leap. 
The longer the leap, however, the mere serious an angular error in the direction. For a leap in the dark 
the likelihood of a happy landing is severely limited."63 Their focus on avoiding error suggests that, 
while they are recognising the importance of the role of the background web of belief in interpreting 
new evidence, they are not as concerned with finding the mean between gullibility and rigidity. I worry 
that conservatism falls too much to the rigid scale of the spectrum. With this in mind, I want to look 
at another intellectual virtue that might answer the question of when it is and is not justified to hold 
beliefs steady.
James Spiegel, in his paper, 'Open-Mindedness and intellectual humility', argues that there 
are two related intellectual virtues that play a role in prescribing how we ought to respond to evidence 
-  namely open-mindedness and intellectual humility.
Spiegel bases his definition of open-mindedness on that of W. Hare. On their view, "To be 
open-minded is...to be critically receptive to alternative possibilities, to be willing to think again 
despite having formulated a view, and to be concerned to defuse any factors that constrain one's 
thinking in predetermined ways".64 We can hold strongly to individual beliefs unless given a reason to 
doubt them, but we take the attitude that we could be wrong, remaining open to the possibility that 
we might need to revise those beliefs. Open-mindedness is, for Spiegel, the mean between dogma 
and gullibility. He argues that "[o]n the one hand, we should aim to avoid automatic dismissal of all 
views that conflict with our own. On the other hand, we should not be so willing to embrace new ideas 
that we have no real convictions."65 Spiegel argues that this virtue is closely tied to that of intellectual 
humility -  seeing oneself and one's intellectual talents relatively accurately -  and thus recognising the 
fallibility present in humans as believers. I take it this attitude towards ourselves is often what causes 
us to be aware of the fallibility of our beliefs as a system, rather than necessarily calling individual 
beliefs into question. We recognise that some of our beliefs are likely false, and remain open to this 
possibility, but this does not necessarily reduce our conviction when it comes to individual beliefs.66
This intellectual virtue captures well the balance I am wanting to strike between rigidity and 
gullibility but it does not capture the idea of the embedded nature of belief. I think perhaps what I'm 
after is something like open-minded conservatism, though that term seems somewhat contradictory. 
I am after something like open-mindedness, but with a recognition of the embedded nature of belief,
63 Quine and Ullian, The Web of Belief, p. 41
64 Hare, 'The ideal of open-mindedness and its place in education', pp. 4-5, in Spiegel, 'Open-Mindedness and 
Intellectual Humility, p. 28.
65 Spiegel, 'Open-Mindedness and Intellectual Humility', p. 29
66 Spiegel, 'Open-Mindedness and Intellectual Humility', pp. 33-34
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and the role it plays in evaluating new information. This involves both conservatism and open­
mindedness. I am undecided about whether it is the case that these are two separate virtues which 
work together closely to form a virtuous approach towards new evidence, or two aspects of one virtue. 
It probably does not make a great deal of difference which of the two is the case. Each would be 
needed to find the balance between rigidity and gullibility. I am roughly inclined to think that they are 
one virtue, and will continue to talk as though this is true, but I do not think that anything I say will be 
incompatible with the view that they are actually two virtues that work together. What I am certain 
of is that the vices attached to the virtue I am looking for are rigidity or dogma, and gullibility. I will 
use the term rigidity, because I think it best captures the fixed nature of the beliefs I am interested in. 
I will -  and have so far -  appropriate the term gullibility from Spiegel, as it perhaps better captures 
the nuances of changing ones belief too easily in response to new evidence or argument.
Open-minded conservatism is, as an epistemic or intellectual virtue, concerned with how we 
inquire. I think that this is mainly to do with our belief webs -  with the centrality of a belief. Its 
justification has to do with the role of previously beliefs in making sense of new evidence, and our 
inability to interpret the world without the benefit of what we already know. Affective states do, 
however, play an important role here in that they attune us to the world in the way Jaggar, de Sousa, 
and Goldie describe. Emotions, for example, draw our attention to which features of the new evidence 
are important for previously held beliefs -  particularly when those beliefs are value-based. If, for 
example, I am confronted with evidence that suggests that marriage equality is correlated with higher 
divorce rates, my emotional response against the challenge to marriage equality is likely to be part of 
what draws my attention to the fact that this evidence is challenging a deeply-held, value-laden belief. 
Emotion also has a role to play when it comes to the open-mindedness element of the open-minded 
conservatism. Part of what it means to be epistemically open-minded and humble, is that one needs 
to be aware of the role that emotions play in informing us about the world, but one also needs to be 
aware of the role they can play in leading us astray. Finding the virtuous mean between gullibility and 
rigidity is going to involve forming the tendency to listen to emotion where it is necessary, but not to 
let it control one's epistemic life.
Whether an instance of holding steady beliefs is a case of open-minded conservatism, 
gullibility or rigidity is something that will need to be determined on a case by case basis. It does seem, 
though, that it may be possible for individual instances of the phenomena to be justified under this 
picture. On the other hand, it seems that hyper-criticality, idee fixe, and polarisation do seem to be 
primarily rigid ways of engaging with the world. Being hyper-critical of evidence seems to me to 
generally tend towards being rigid, as it means that, by definition, one is unlikely to give up on the 
belief. Polarisation seems to be a result of rigidity, rather than a cause of it. One does not take evidence
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against one's belief to support it unless one is already rigidly holding onto that belief. Idee fixe, it 
seems to me, is the only one of the three phenomena that could sometimes be justified under this 
picture, in cases where there are beliefs that we ought to hold steady, perhaps. Idee fixe involves 
holding a belief steady in the face of counter-evidence, which seems on the surface to suggest that 
this phenomenon involves a tendency towards rigidity. On the other hand, if there are circumstances 
where it is justifiable to hold them steady, then it is possible to engage in idee fixe without being 
epistemically vicious.
On the picture I have set out, then, it is not rigid to hold onto central and/or important beliefs, 
insofar as holding onto them is a result of using previously held beliefs as tools to interpret and judge 
new evidence. When we start moving from doing this to letting our previous beliefs interfere with the 
genuine weight of the evidence, it becomes problematic. As an intellectual virtue, open-minded 
conservatism applies most appropriately to the centrality of beliefs, but importance can affect it as 
well. It can either aid us to avoid gullibility, or push us towards rigidity. The phenomena tend towards 
rigidity, but it is in principle possible for them to be virtuous on this account. What I have not done yet 
is show where this account fits into the broader literature on epistemology.
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Chapter 4: A possible objection: do fixed mental states count as 
beliefs?
In the first three chapters of this thesis, I have narrowed the broader term “confirmation bias” down 
to find the elements I am interested in -  namely hyper-criticality, idee fixe, and belief polarization. I 
have looked at how these phenomena might relate to our belief webs, and how they might be affected 
by affective states, as opposed to purely epistemic ones. In this chapter, I will examine a possible 
objection to the picture that I have set out thus far. It is a common view in the literature on belief that 
in order to count as a belief, a mental state has to be evidence-responsive. If this is true, it is possible 
that the mental states I have been talking about are not beliefs. If this is the case, one might think that 
the epistemological interpretation I have provided of these mental states is rather misguided. One 
perhaps cannot, for example, talk about epistemic virtues and vices with regard to mental states which 
are not beliefs. In this chapter, I will try to counter this objection by looking at the literature on fixed 
beliefs.67 I will discuss Grace Helton's view that fixed beliefs do, in fact, count as beliefs. Given this, I 
will try and spell out roughly what it might mean to say someone has a fixed belief, and how we might 
tell this. It is worth stating from the outset than I am not doing metaphysics here. I am interested in 
the everyday ways in which we experience, and talk about, belief.
4.1. Do steady beliefs count as beliefs?
I have so far been assuming that the phenomena -  particularly idee fixe and hyper-criticality -  apply 
to beliefs. I have been assuming, essentially, that holding a belief steady does not mean that it is not 
a belief. It is commonly held in the literature about beliefs, however, that in order to count as a belief, 
a mental state has to be responsive to evidence. Nikolai Viedge sets out the argument for this claim 
as follows:
1. "Beliefs are mental states that are governed by truth.
2. To be governed by truth is to be evidence responsive.
3. Therefore, evidence responsiveness is a necessary feature of beliefs such that if a mental state 
is evidence non-responsive it cannot be a belief."68
Under this view, it seems that evidence-resistant beliefs cannot count as beliefs (or fixed beliefs, I will 
use the terms interchangeably). There are presumably nuances, but I am specifically interested in 
beliefs that are fixed due to hyper-criticality -  namely beliefs that are resisting evidence. If this is the
67 I am referring here to beliefs which are held steady in the case of evidence, not beliefs about whether or not 
certain characteristics, such as intelligence, are fixed.
68 Viedge, 'Defending Evidence-resistant Beliefs', p. 2
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case, it is possible that what I have been calling beliefs that are held steady are not, in fact, beliefs, but 
rather delusions, or some similar mental state. Idee fixe is, after all, the phenomenon of holding beliefs 
steady in the face of evidence. Hyper-criticality is a way of going about this. These phenomena are, 
presumably, not the only way of going about having a fixed mental state, but they certainly seem to 
be one way of doing so. If fixed mental states do not count as beliefs, then mental states which are 
prone to these phenomena do not either. As Viedge argues, however, it seems that there are some 
beliefs which fail to be responsive to evidence, and yet which do seem to be beliefs -  namely bigoted 
beliefs such as racist, sexist, and sexually prejudiced ones. Viedge's intuition -  one I share -  is that 
these mental states do count as beliefs. One reason to think this might be that we tend to treat these 
kind of mental states as beliefs. We think that they ought to be held accountable to the norms of belief 
-  we think, in other words, that they should respond to counter-evidence.69 The fact that we treat 
something as a belief does not necessarily mean that we can say that it definitely is a belief. On the 
other hand, it does give us some reason to think that perhaps these evidence-resistant mental states 
are in fact beliefs.
More strongly, Viedge argues that evidence-resistant mental states ought to be counted as 
beliefs because they meet the other defining qualities of belief -  they are context-independent and 
influence other beliefs and mental states.70 To say that a belief P is context-independent is to say "that 
a belief that p governs the behavior of S in all contexts where p is relevant."71 So my belief that I am 
allergic to alcohol will lead me to avoid drinking alcohol in numerous different situations, to refuse 
brandy-soaked Christmas pudding, etc. A different kind of mental state, such as putting Appletiser in 
a champagne glass and imagining that it is actually champagne, would not lead me either to treat 
Appletiser differently in any other situation, or make me drink champagne in a different situation, 
because I did not react to the Appletiser. It is only within that particular imagining that my behaviour 
towards Appletiser changes in any way. Similarly, a racist, sexist, or sexually prejudiced belief is likely 
to have an impact on one's behaviour outside of any particular context. It might, for example, cause 
one to avoid spending time with certain people, or it might cause one to have certain responses to 
the sight of gay couples with children, and so on. In terms of the second criterion, beliefs are able to 
be used as a basis for inferences that allow one to form other beliefs (or, presumably, other mental 
states such as attitudes).72 So my belief that I am allergic to alcohol is the basis of my belief that I 
should not eat the Christmas pudding containing brandy, for example. Similarly, someone's belief that
69 Viedge, 'Defending Evidence-resistant Beliefs', p. 11
70 Viedge is using Van Leeuwen's conditions here. For the original paper, see Van Leeuwen, 'Religious Credence 
is not Factual Belief'.
71 Viedge, 'Defending Evidence-Resistant Beliefs', p. 12
72 Viedge, 'Defending Evidence-Resistant Belief', p. 14
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having gay parents is harmful to children is likely to influence further beliefs, such as what adoption 
rights gay people should and should not have. It is possible, of course, that there could be fixed mental 
states that fall under racism, sexism, or sexual prejudice, that do not meet these criteria. In that case, 
I would imagine that the mental state in question does not count as a belief. On the other hand, it 
seems to me that in the majority of cases, the beliefs that Viedge is discussing -  and the beliefs that I 
am interested in -  are going to meet these criteria.
It seems, then, that it is possible for beliefs to be evidence-resistant and yet still count as 
beliefs. The problem then is how to respond to the argument given above for the claim that because 
beliefs are directed in some way at truth, they have to be evidence-responsive in order to count as 
beliefs. To put it a different way, the question of how beliefs can be both truth-directed and evidence- 
resistant remains.
Grace Helton, in an unpublished paper, gives what I think is a very convincing answer to this 
question (one Viedge endorses in the paper I have been referring to). She argues that it is true that 
for a mental state to count as a belief, it has to be in-principle evidence-responsive. Because beliefs 
are governed by truth, they have to, in principle, respond to evidence, which is a guide to the truth or 
falsity of a belief. Helton argues, however, that an in-principle responsiveness to evidence does not 
necessarily mean that a particular belief will change in response to evidence. It is possible, she argues, 
for the impact or relevance of the evidence on a particular belief to be masked, such that the agent 
does not change her belief in response to that evidence. The agent does not recognise the impact of 
the evidence in the same way she would were the evidence not being masked. Essentially, what it 
means to say that a belief is, in principle, responsive to evidence is to say that if the mask were not 
there, the belief would change in response to counter-evidence.
Helton phrases her argument for the claim that beliefs must be, in principle, revisable as a 
form of an 'ought implies can' argument. Her argument runs as follows:
1. "All beliefs are rationally required to be revised in response to conflicting evidence.
2. If some mental state is rationally required to be revised in response to conflicting evidence, 
then that mental state can be revised in response to conflicting evidence.
3. All beliefs can be revised in response to conflicting evidence."73
Mental states, then, must be, in principle, evidence-responsive in order to count as beliefs. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that every mental state that counts as a belief will necessarily be 
revised in response to evidence. It is possible for the effect of the evidence to be masked. Helton 
explains this concept through the metaphor of glass. Glass can, in principle, break if it is struck with 
enough force. The same force, however, will not always break a piece of glass. If I drop a vase on a
73 Helton, 'The Revisablity View of Belief', p. 2
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tiled floor, for example, or hit it with something, it is likely to break. If the same vase is wrapped in a 
heavy blanket or bubble wrap, however, it might not break if dropped or struck.74 Similarly, while 
beliefs, according to Helton's argument, must, in principle, be able to change in response to evidence, 
something such as strong emotion might mask this ability. In her words:
For at least many beliefs in humans, the conditions which tend to facilitate rational 
belief revision are those in which all of the following hold: the belief and the 
evidence which contravenes it are both conscious and attended; the belief is not 
underpinned by strong emotion; and the subject enjoys available processing capacity. 
Correspondingly, for such beliefs, typical masks of the capacity to be revised will 
include conditions in which: the belief or the evidence which contravenes it are 
unattended or non-conscious; the belief is underpinned by strong emotion; or the 
subject lacks available processing capacity.75
If one of these masks -  or, for that matter a mask that is not on the list -  is in place, then the belief is 
less likely to change in response to evidence, even though it, in principle, can. The belief is still, in 
principle, revisable, because if the mask were not there, the belief would change in response to the 
evidence. It does not in fact change, however, when the belief is masked.
Helton does not think that the list of possible masks she outlines here is necessarily an 
exhaustive one. She does not go into much detail about how the masks might work, or how they might 
relate to each other. I am not terribly interested in the last one -  the lack of ability to process the 
evidence. Helton spells this out in terms of something like the inability of someone who does not read 
Mandarin to spot a glaring error in a Mandarin to English translation -  we simply cannot expect the 
person to do that. She does not have the capacity to, because she does not speak one of the 
languages.76 She is not rationally required to do so. Similarly, someone who is not able to understand 
a very complex scientific article perhaps cannot be expected to understand its impact on a particular 
view she holds. Say something in a paper about complex physics means that a particular view of 
causation cannot be true, for example. An agent, A, with that view of causation, might read an article 
which deals with that particular section of science, but which does not specifically discuss the view of 
causation. A perhaps cannot be expected to draw the connection between the science and the view 
of causation, if she does not understand the science particularly well.77 The impact of the evidence is 
masked to the agent, as she does not understand its implications, but she is not being evidence-
74 Helton, 'The Revisability View of Belief', pp. 8-9
75 Helton, 'The Revisablity View of Belief', p. 9
76 Helton, 'The Revisability View of Belief', p. 15
77 If the conclusion of the paper is to do with her view, then perhaps one might argue that the epistemic 
authority of a peer-reviewed scientific article might give her some reason to change the belief, but if it is an 
indirect result, as in this case, I do not think the same can be said.
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resistant in the way that I am interested in. Furthermore, I think it is unlikely that this kind of masking 
is particularly prevalent when it comes to sexually prejudiced beliefs (or other kinds of prejudicial 
beliefs for that matter). On the other hand, I think that the other two masks Helton mentions -  the 
belief or evidence being unattended, or the belief being underpinned by strong emotion -  are both 
particularly relevant to sexually prejudiced beliefs.
I think that Helton's interpretation of what is happening in cases of evidence-resistance is 
right. Furthermore, I think that in cases of idee fixe, where beliefs are central and/or important, their 
centrality and/or importance serve as a motivation to mask counter-evidence we come across. When 
we engage in things like hyper-criticality, it seems to me that we are engaging in strategies aimed at 
masking evidence, in order to keep the beliefs steady. I diverge from Helton, though, in that I think 
that these factors can also be decidedly epistemically valuable. She may not be opposed to the idea, 
but it is not the focus of her paper. On my view, it is only when the impact of these affective states is 
not what it ought to be that the interplay between them and beliefs is problematic.
In the case of an important belief, where affective states are influencing beliefs in problematic 
ways, the importance of the belief serves as a mask. Helton points to emotion as a possible mask. I 
think that what I have said in Chapter 2 of this thesis can serve as an elaboration of how this could 
work. I have argued that importance gives us a motivation to hold beliefs steady -  to engage in idee 
fixe. I would argue that this fits rather neatly into Helton's picture. Emotional importance can make 
us less likely to appreciate the evidence -  it is, after all, in order to avoid fully appreciating the evidence 
that we engage in hyper-criticality. It is possible that on Helton's view, some mental states that are 
held steady by virtue of being important do not count as beliefs -  namely if they are even, in principle, 
incapable of being revised in response to evidence. I think, however, that in many cases, the beliefs 
that I am interested in are held steady in practice, rather than in principle. If the beliefs were not as 
emotionally important as they are, it seems likely that they would change in response to evidence. 
Whether or not this is true is, of course, an empirical question.
It is harder to see how centrality might count as a mask. Roughly, though, if a belief is central, 
and we come into contact with counter-evidence, in causing us to evaluate the evidence differently, 
the belief might be seen as being masked by the structure of the other beliefs of the agent in question.
Essentially, I think that the ways in which importance and centrality can motivate one to 
engage in idee fixe, and thus hyper-criticality, perhaps leading to polarization, could be seen as masks 
in Helton's sense. Hyper-criticality is a way of engaging with evidence such that the masks which 
protect the belief being challenged stay in place, leading to idee fixe. In combination with the 
battlefield attitude towards argument, this could lead to polarization.
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I am not sure whether Helton and I would necessarily agree on which mental states count as 
beliefs. I am not sure, for example, whether Helton would see what I have been calling polarized 
beliefs as beliefs, rather than delusions. The irrational element of a belief getting stronger in the face 
of conflicting evidence may, on Helton's view, disqualify the mental state from being a belief, and 
make it a delusion instead. I would argue that it is still the case that they are in principle evidence 
responsive because if the mask in question were not in place, the belief would not have become 
polarized in the way that it did. It is going to be a matter of fact, though, whether and when polarized 
beliefs do change, and what they change in response to.
4.2. The "fixed" element of fixed beliefs.
I have suggested that beliefs which are subject to the phenomena are a form of fixed belief. I have 
agreed with both Viedge and Helton that fixed beliefs do count as beliefs, and not some other kind of 
mental state. I now want to specifically spell out what I think makes something a fixed belief. I will 
then briefly look at how we might be able to tell that someone has a fixed belief, though I do not have 
a definitive answer to that question.
Part of what makes it difficult to tie down what counts as a fixed belief is that there are so 
many different beliefs which do not respond to counter-evidence, but which are all evaluated 
differently by our current epistemic standards. Person A and Person B from the example of the debate 
I mentioned in Chapter 1 each have fixed beliefs and engage in idee fixe and hyper-criticality. I am 
unwilling to give up on my belief that 2+2=4. Someone who is racist or sexually prejudiced is unwilling 
to give up on their racist or sexually prejudiced beliefs. I am also unwilling to give up on my belief that 
racism and sexual prejudice are both wrong -  both morally and epistemically. It is not entirely clear 
whether all of these beliefs count as evidence-resistant.
The sexually prejudiced person has a belief which does not respond to evidence (at least in 
the cases I am interested in). The difference between her prejudiced belief, and the belief that 2+2=4, 
however, is not entirely clear. It is not enough to say that she should give up on one but not the other, 
because that still does not answer the question of what it is about the two kinds of beliefs that are 
different, and what they have in common. To put it slightly differently, neither kind of belief changes 
in response to what we would, at least in some situations, consider evidence. In the former case, the 
sexually prejudiced person perhaps has a belief that the children of gay parents are missing a vital 
component of their childhood. This belief might not change in response to a social science paper that 
evaluates the happiness and/or functionality of children of gay parents versus the children of straight
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ones78, and finds that there is no difference. In the second case, the belief that 2+2=4 does not respond 
to observational evidence. Normally we would consider both observational evidence and a social 
scientific study as constituting evidence -  though one difference is that we would think the sexually 
prejudiced person's belief should change (normatively speaking), but we would not expect 2+2=4 to 
change. Given that both count as evidence, part of what I am interested in is why we think the former 
should change, but not the latter. I do not think it can simply be a case of one being right. Something 
that seems to be good evidence by normal standards presumably should give an agent, at the very 
least, a first-person reason to believe, even if it later turns out that the evidence was wrong. Finally, it 
is not clear what the difference is between my fixed belief that sexual prejudice is wrong, and the 
sexually prejudiced person's belief that homosexuality is wrong. There is a moral difference, but it is 
not clear yet whether there is an epistemic difference (beyond the fact that I believe that as a matter 
of fact I am right and the sexually prejudiced person is wrong). Furthermore, if there is an epistemic 
difference, it is not clear how that ought to be spelled out.
Given the previous chapters of this thesis, it may be fairly easy to see what the essence of my 
view on fixed beliefs is going to be. A fixed belief is, at its core, one which is rigid, rather than open- 
mindendly conservative. This means, strangely, that beliefs which are fixed in the face of counter­
evidence can still fail to count as fixed beliefs. In order to count particularly as a fixed belief, the 
believer has to hold that belief steady in the fact of evidence in such a way that she is being rigid, 
rather than using her background beliefs to interpret and judge new evidence. She might also count 
as having a fixed belief if her affective states are making her rigid -  masking evidence, rather than 
attuning her to the world.
On this interpretation, mathematical beliefs such as 2+2=4 are not fixed beliefs, though they 
do not respond to evidence. They are held steady in the interest of avoiding gullibility. Our already- 
held beliefs about mathematics, the level of evidence that our epistemic standards require for 
changing a belief as central as this, and our knowledge of the effectiveness of mathematics in 
describing the world, all support the belief that 2+2=4. Resisting observational evidence is not yet 
rigid. There may, however, come a time when failing to revise (or give up on) the belief that 2+2=4 
does become rigid. There is nothing about it that protects it from this possibility. If enough evidence 
mounts up to suggest that we ought to revise it, or even give it up, then failing to do so is likely to be 
rigid.
Mathematical beliefs are thus not fixed beliefs. They are central, and thus held in the face of 
contrary evidence, but they are not rigid. The sexually prejudiced person's beliefs, and mine, however,
78 This is a factual belief, which is part of a sexually prejudiced world view. It brings with it value judgements, as 
well as implications for other beliefs, such as whether gay people should be allowed to adopt children, etc.
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may be -  as may Person A and Person B's. In each of our cases, the centrality of, and the effect of our 
affective states on, our beliefs means that we are not engaging with each other's evidence seriously. 
This sounds more like a tendency towards rigidity than open-minded conservatism. While this 
definition allows us to draw conclusions about these kinds of beliefs, however, it does not give us a 
guideline which is always going to give clear answers to whether a particular belief is fixed or not. It is 
sometimes easy to tell whether or not someone is being rigid -  it is easy, for example, to say that the 
person refusing to change a mathematical belief because of a disappearing sock is not being rigid -  
but it may not be so easy with less clear-cut beliefs. I will briefly touch on the kind of things that might 
give us a clue as to whether people are being rigid, but I do not think they are definitive.
One option is that a rigid belief is one which does not change in response to evidence which 
would be strong enough to cause the agent to change other beliefs. So if someone has a belief that 
members of a certain race group are less intelligent than members of another, they might not respond 
to the overwhelming evidence to the contrary - for example, the numerous studies within psychology 
and biology that show this not to be true. On the other hand, they would likely be convinced by the 
same kind of studies which showed a different conclusion. If this is the case, then we can perhaps say 
that this belief is rigid. We cannot say, given this as an identifying quality of fixed beliefs, that someone 
who just does not accept that social science is good evidence is being rigid. They might not have a very 
good epistemic system, but the problem would lie elsewhere. Rigidity comes in when there is a kind 
of evidence which convinces someone in the case of some belief, but not in the case of others. This 
criterion is, I think, helpful. If a piece of evidence is being treated differently for no apparent reason, 
it is a clue that something problematic is going on. On the other hand, we do not necessarily have 
access to the details of why someone is resisting a particular kind of evidence. Furthermore, there 
may be reasons why someone is resisting a particular piece of evidence that takes it out of the realm 
of rigidity -  perhaps their emotional response, for example, is actually telling them something about 
the world that we are missing. These kind of considerations mean that this criterion is not enough to 
tell when someone is being evidence-resistant, or when they have a non-rigid fixed belief.
Another option79 is that a rigid belief is one which does not change in the face of evidence that 
the epistemic community thinks ought to inspire change.80 I take it that the epistemic community 
would serve as a measure for standards for evidence rather than dealing with particular pieces of
79 This section of my view was developed partly in conversations with Nikolai Viedge, and I cannot claim full 
credit for it. He also gave a conference presentation at the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa's annual 
conference, held in January 2017, which influenced my discussion here.
80 I do not think that seeing this as a possible way of telling whether or not someone has a rigid belief involves 
assuming that the only standard for how we ought to respond to evidence is inter-subjective, and dependent 
on one's epistemic community. The epistemic community sets standards which are generally used to judge 
people's responses to evidence, but it does not set the standards of evidence entirely.
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evidence. So, for example, the epistemic community would see social science studies, which have 
been peer reviewed, and meet certain criteria, count as good evidence and, other things being equal, 
one should take those kinds of studies as good evidence. Again, this is useful. We do tend to rely on 
the standards of our epistemic community. On the other hand, we want to be able to say that the 
epistemic community can be wrong about whether something counts as good evidence. Evidence that 
the Earth went around the sun was still evidence, even if the epistemic community at the time of 
Copernicus or Galilei didn't think so. Evidence that there was no essential difference between black 
and white people was still evidence, even in communities which refused to accept this. Similarly, 
before the invention of the term sexual harassment, the epistemic community was missing something 
in their descriptions of the possible interactions between men and women. Here I am perhaps being 
a little unfair, in that I am judging retrospectively, using the standards of my epistemic community, 
rather than the standards of the time. That, however, might excuse individuals within that epistemic 
community without claiming that the community itself was right. It is specifically their beliefs that are 
excusable here, rather than their actions. The person sexually harassing a woman or women was still 
doing something wrong -  and presumably, given that the women were uncomfortable, he (or she) 
could, even at the time, have been expected to change his behaviour. It is specifically the epistemic 
resources of the community, and the explanatory beliefs people could be excused for failing to form, 
that I am referring to here. This makes me think that the standards of the epistemic community are 
simply indicators of when a belief ought to change, rather than a standard-creating entity -  and 
furthermore, that it, like consistency -  is not a solid standard.
I think, then, that whether someone's response to a piece of evidence is consistent with their 
overall responses to that kind of evidence, and with the standards of the epistemic community, gives 
us a clue as to whether or not they are being rigid. I do not think, however, that either of these factors 
are definitive at all -  each is problematic. Furthermore, joining them together would not make them 
any more definitive -  the problems with each are not offset by the other.
This lack of definitive criteria for rigidity, as opposed to open-minded conservatism, is partly 
due to the nature of virtues -  arguing that something is a virtue does not get one to a list of things 
that count as being virtuous on that picture. Virtues give us a more fluid picture than the project of 
forming such a list would allow for. Given this, I am happy to settle for the rough criteria that I have 
set out here. Fixed/evidence-resistant beliefs, then, do count as beliefs. They are beliefs that are in 
principle evidence-responsive, but whose response to actual evidence is being masked. I have argued 
that beliefs that are affected by the phenomena are such beliefs, and that two possible masks are 
centrality and importance. Given this, I have tried to give an account of fixed beliefs which takes into 
account the role of these factors. I have argued that fixed beliefs are ones which resist evidence to the
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point where they are rigid, rather than open-mindedly conservative. Given that engaging in the 
phenomena is one way of being rigid, beliefs which are prone to them fit into this picture as being a 
kind of fixed belief. This picture suggests that my picture can withstand the objection that the mental 
states that I have been talking about do not count as beliefs.
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Conclusion
There are several questions suggested by this thesis which I have not had the space to consider. I have 
mentioned that I think the work I have done is relevant to combatting prejudice, particularly sexual 
prejudice. I have not yet been able to spell out exactly how. I have talked about the implications my 
view has for argument, but not how we might avoid the pitfalls that we encounter when trying to 
combat prejudice through it.
Firstly, I think that Helton is right to say that in the case of beliefs which are resistant to 
evidence, the impact of the evidence is being masked. Given this, there might be a place for using non­
evidential means to get other people to change their minds without raising the problems that would 
normally need to be considered by someone engaging in such a project. The problem with using non- 
epistemic means as a way of convincing someone of a position, is that it seems to be a fairly 
problematic epistemic route. We tend to think that beliefs ought to be based on evidence, and so it is 
worrying to use emotional manipulation, for example, to change others' beliefs. If, however, one is 
engaging with someone else's emotions and attitudes in order to remove a mask that they have, then 
it seems that one is not, strictly speaking, emotionally manipulating someone into changing their 
belief. The emotional or attitudinal engagement would need to be combined with an evidence-based 
argument. Furthermore, engaging with people on an emotional, value-based, or attitudinal level 
could, rather than serving as emotional manipulation, draw their attention to features of the world, 
in the way Jaggar, de Sousa, and Goldie describe.
Engaging with people on an emotional, value-based, or attitudinal level might therefore be a 
way of engaging people on topics that might be prone to importance-motivated idee fixe. It may, 
though, be necessary to engage with the person whose beliefs one is trying to change on an evidential 
level as well, in order to change someone else's belief and still remain epistemically justified.
Secondly, I have been focusing on sexual prejudice in this thesis -  and particularly sexual 
prejudice towards gay men and lesbian women. In the interests of avoiding skating over important 
differences in the life experiences of, and attitudes towards, different groups, I have narrowed my 
focus. I do think, however, that much of what I have said would apply elsewhere -  both to different 
kinds of sexual prejudice (prejudice against bisexual, transgender, intersex, asexual and queer people, 
for example), and to different kinds of prejudice. Expanding this account would be a valuable project.
Thirdly, I do want to say that there is a difference between my beliefs and those of the sexually 
prejudiced person -  epistemologically as well as ethically. I find myself, however, even after this thesis, 
without the tools to do so justifiably -  at least I do not yet have these tools. The sexually prejudiced 
person and I are each prone to uneven engagements with the evidence. I do think I'm right, but so 
does she. The epistemological differences between us, if any, still need to be spelled out, but I am
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unsure of how to do that. Furthermore, the interplay between possible ethical and epistemological 
differences between us is also something that invites investigation. There seem to me to be some 
beliefs which it is right to hold steady, both morally and epistemologically. Beliefs that prejudice is 
wrong fall under this category.
Finally, much of what I have said is open to empirical investigation. I think that my view is at 
least plausible, but it touches on matters of fact, which need empirical investigation. This thesis is an 
outlining of how I think the phenomena might work -  much of that picture could, and ought, to be 
tested.
There are still questions, then, that I think need to be answered, but which I cannot tackle in 
this thesis. What I have done, is argue that one of the challenges to combatting sexual prejudice is 
that people on either side of the debate, while they ostensibly engage with each other on the issues 
in question, tend to engage with the opposing evidence in order to reject it. I have argued that part of 
what might be going on here, is that participants in each side of the debate might be engaging in 
confirmation bias. After drawing out several sub-phenomena which I think fall under the broad 
phenomenon of confirmation bias, I narrowed my focus to idee fixe, hyper-criticality, and polarization. 
I argued that the motivations for these phenomena can be found in the way our belief systems usually 
work, both in terms of their web-like structure, and in terms of the interplay between our beliefs, and 
affective elements such as emotions, attitudes, and values. Negotiating evidence in such a way that 
we respond to it, while still recognising the role played by the structure of belief, and the effect of 
affect on it, is, I argued, an epistemic virtue. Finally, I argued that my picture can withstand the 
objection that the mental states I have been talking about are not beliefs, arguing that they are fixed 
beliefs, in roughly the sense that Helton means.
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